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I. IMPETUS FOR TRANSFORMING CODE OF CONDUCT 
TRAINING 
A. PURPOSE 
This research explores the impact of The National Military Strategy of the 
United States of America 2004 (NMS) security environment on Code of Conduct 
(CoC) training.  The NMS describes the transformation of existing Department of 
Defense (DoD) human talent and operational capabilities in preparation for the 
future worldwide challenges presented in the National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America (NSS).  As the strategic direction changes for all 
components of the United States military, it is critical to ascertain the required 
capabilities needed to achieve the desired goals, examine the existing training 
programs, and determine the most effective method to prepare the force for 
future joint and combined operations.   
As the U.S. pursues the War on Terrorism (WOT) and prepares to combat 
both state and non-state threats in conventional and asymmetric environments, 
the DoD must prepare its military and civilian personnel for the mental and 
physical challenges encountered before, during, and after capture by an 
adversary.  The current Level A, B, and C CoC training programs prepare DoD 
personnel for survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) throughout the 
captivity cycle in support of Personnel Recovery (PR) operations. 
This paper will examine the historical and legal foundations of the modern 
day Code of Conduct and its applicability in the asymmetric threat environment.  
Following an analysis of the future components of conventional and asymmetric 
warfare, the study will explore the ability of existing CoC training to enhance the 
survivability of DoD, interagency, and multinational assets throughout the 
spectrum of captivity. 
B. BACKGROUND 
During peacetime and wartime, all military and civilian members of the 
U.S. Armed Forces risk capture and detention by hostile forces.  Despite the 
many innovative technological advancements now employed for force protection, 
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military and civilian personnel still remain the most vulnerable asset in the 
warfighting arsenal.  The increasing frequency of deployments in support of 
operations worldwide exposes DoD, United States Government employees, and 
multinational partners to asymmetric threats determined to capture and exploit 
American assets.   
In May 2004, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff introduced the NMS 
as the plan to transform current military capabilities to accomplish the objectives 
outlined by President Bush in the NSS.  The DoD is transitioning away from a 
full-scale conventional war mindset focused on a particular threat or conflict 
location.  Military force composition and capabilities of the future will enable 
America to pursue any adversary worldwide.  CoC and SERE training must 
provide DoD personnel with a flexible set of captivity survival skills that mirror the 
fluidity of the battlespace. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
This study provides a mechanism to examine and expose potential 
deficiencies in the international legal rights and protections of POWs, detainees, 
and hostages.  U.S. military and civilian personnel must enter the battlespace 
fully cognizant of the lack of legal protection and understand the vital importance 
of CoC training.  A thorough examination of the envisioned NMS security 
environment and the future components of warfare provide a new context 
through which to evaluate existing CoC training programs and determine the 
overall applicability of the course content to the expanded captivity environment. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis analyzes the origins of the CoC and its associated training 
programs and, based on the future structure of conventional and asymmetric 
warfare, recommends a new training methodology to prepare U.S. forces for 
captivity.   
Chapter II investigates the origin of the modern day CoC and the ability of 
existing international laws, domestic directives, and Service regulations and 
training programs to protect American POWs, detainees, and hostages.  The 
review of the CoC progresses historically starting with the evolution of prisoner 
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treatment from the 1700s to 1900s and the events precipitating the creation of 
the Geneva Conventions and additional Protocols.  The Geneva Convention 
analysis includes a discussion on determining combatant status and the 
relevance of the Conventions in the asymmetric environment.  The Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (UCMJ) is then examined as the punitive mechanism for 
violating particular articles of the Geneva Conventions.  The CoC is a moral 
guide that enables Service members to comply with articles of both the Geneva 
Conventions and the UCMJ.  The history of the CoC and its application to 
detention and hostage situations is discussed prior to an examination of existing 
Service CoC regulations and training programs. 
Chapter III concentrates on the future components of warfare, including 
the proposed force composition, security environment, and expanded 
battlespace.  The increased exposure to conventional and asymmetric 
challenges necessitates a review of the spectrum of captivity and the potential 
political, economic, and military costs of captivity. 
Chapter IV assesses the existing CoC training in light of the future 
components of warfare and proposes a new training program in line with the 
NMS.  The research initially focuses on the moral and psychological foundations 
required to increase the effectiveness of the program.  Subsequently, an 
evaluation of the existing Level A, B, and C programs, with the assistance of 
American officer and enlisted students at the Naval Postgraduate School and 
Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, demonstrates the need for a 
new course.  The core captivity curriculum training program represents a viable 
alternative to current CoC training.  As contingency operations frequently involve 
U.S. government civilian employees and multinational partners, the final section 
explores non-DoD conduct after capture codes and training programs.  
International officers attending the Naval Postgraduate School provide valuable 
insights into their nations CoC programs. 
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Chapter V discusses the overall conclusions resulting from the study and 
provides recommendations for changes in policy, mindset, training, and 
























II. CODE OF CONDUCT: FOUNDATION FOR 
CONTEMPORARY SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, AND 
ESCAPE 
A. OVERVIEW 
The tenets of the Code of Conduct permeate all aspects of military life and 
serve as the framework for SERE-related training and operations.  The CoC of 
today is steeped in the lessons learned from POW experiences throughout 
history and provides a mechanism for American military personnel to stay within 
the international and domestic legal boundaries established during the Cold War 
for the captivity cycle.  As the United States transforms from threat-based to 
capabilities-based combat operations in the NMS security environment, one must 
examine the ability of existing international laws, domestic directives, and Service 
regulations to protect American military and civilian POWs, detainees, and 
hostages while under enemy control.  Although the legal status and standards of 
treatment for American forces participating in conventional state-on-state 
conflicts are fairly well defined, the international law community has not fully 
addressed the many new post-Cold War “gray areas” of unconventional warfare 
that will undoubtedly affect personnel in the NMS battlespace.   
As the international community develops new laws to address the ever-
evolving nature of the threat, DoD regulatory guidance governing the actions of 
military, civilian, and contracted personnel must adjust to ensure proper 
compliance.  International law, also referred to as the law of nations or jus 
gentium, directs the actions of states and international organizations through 
either treaty agreements or customary practices considered legally binding.1  A 
brief examination of the historical evolution of prisoner abuse and exploitation 
reveals the genesis of the international and domestic laws governing the humane 
treatment of captured personnel.  An analysis of the Geneva Conventions, 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Code of Conduct, and DoD-specific regulations 
supports the assertion that the existing legal framework, while still applicable to                                             
1 U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General School, The Military Commander and the Law, 
(Alabama: AFJAGS Press, 2000), 591-592 [hereafter referred to as: USAFJAGS, pp.#]. 
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conventional warfare, does not adequately protect captives across the entire 
spectrum of captivity. 
B. EVOLUTION OF PRISONER TREATMENT: 1700S TO 1900S 
The treatment of POWs throughout history directly reflects the political and 
socio-cultural environment of the period.  The evolution of the nature and 
prosecution of warfare caused a corresponding shift in the role of POWs.  During 
the early seventeenth century, jus gentium prescribed that captured enemy 
personnel or materiel transferred ownership directly to the captor.  Soldiers and 
sailors, if not killed immediately after capture, transitioned to the role of slave 
laborers.  The carnage of war and brutal mistreatment of captives inspired Dutch 
jurist and humanist Hugo Grotius to propose a set of rules guiding militaries 
toward a more humanitarian form of combat.  Although Grotius failed to gain 
support for the concept of humane standards of conduct in war, his ideas 
influenced the thinking of eighteenth century European philosophers and leaders.  
As conventional warfare evolved in European nations, particularly England and 
France, advocates called for reciprocal civilized treatment of enemy POWs.  
Subsequently, military personnel engaged in traditional force-on-force battle 
could expect reasonably civilized treatment after capture.  The American 
Revolution introduced a unique challenge to the established international 
customs as American soldiers employed guerrilla warfare tactics in an insurgent-
style uprising against the British government.  Ineligible for POW status, captured 
American soldiers and sailors were harshly physically abused or executed as 
common criminals.2   
Unfortunately, England set the standard of behavior for the American 
soldiers, as witnessed later in the Civil War.  The blatant abuse and neglect of 
soldiers in internment camps outraged the American public and convinced 
President Abraham Lincoln to enlist the expertise of Columbia University 
Professor Francis Lieber to draft regulatory directives.  “Issued on April 24, 1863, 
as United States War Department General Order 100, ‘Instructions for the 
                                            
2 Veterans Administration – Office of Planning and Program Evaluation, POW: Study of 
Former Prisoners of War, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 23-25 
[hereafter referred to as: Veterans Administration, pp.#]. 
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Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,’ the ‘Lieber Code’ was 
the first uniform code on treatment of POWs and was a milestone in the history of 
war.”3  The Lieber Code contained, but is not limited to, the following guidance: 
No belligerent has the right to declare that he will treat every 
captured man in arms…as a brigand or a bandit. 
A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public 
enemy, nor is any revenge weakened upon him by the intentional 
infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want 
of food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity. 
A prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes committed 
before the captor’s army or people (for crimes) committed before he 
was captured, and for which he has not been punished by his own 
authorities. 
A prisoner of war…is the prisoner of the government and not of the 
captor. 
Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or imprisonment such 
as may be deemed necessary on account of safety, but they are to 
be subjected to no other intentional suffering or indignity. 
A prisoner of war who escapes may be shot, or otherwise killed in 
flight; but neither death nor any other punishment shall be inflicted 
on him for his attempt to escape, which the law of order does not 
consider a crime.  Stricter means of security shall be used after an 
unsuccessful attempt of escape. 
Every captured wounded man shall be medically treated according 
to the ability of the medical staff.4 
Additionally, the standards and principles contained in the Lieber Code 
later served as the groundwork for rules guiding the conduct of armed hostilities 
between sovereign nations, a subset of international law known as the Law of 
Armed Conflict (LOAC).   
LOAC consists of two major elements, “…customary international law 
arising out of the conduct of nations during hostilities and binding upon all 
nations, and treaty laws (also called conventional law) arising from international 
                                            
3 Ibid., 26. 
4 Ibid., 25. 
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treaties and only binds those nations that have ratified a particular treaty.”5  
During captivity, POWs are subject to the military laws of their own country as 
well as those of the enemy government.  A prisoner can be held accountable for 
criminal acts committed prior to capture and throughout the detention period.  
LOAC treaty law contains agreements negotiated in the Netherlands at the 
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899, 1907, and 1914 and in Switzerland at the 
Geneva Conferences of 1864, 1929, 1949, and 1977.  The Lieber Code, 
resurrected at the 1874 conference in Brussels, guided the discussions of the 
twenty-six member 1899 Hague Conference.  The Hague and Geneva 
Conferences produced conventions designed to provide participating nations with 
minimum standards of acceptable and reciprocal conduct on the battlefield.  
While the resulting Hague Conventions center around lawful and illegal “means 
and methods” of conducting warfare, the Geneva Conventions outline the rights 
and protections afforded to military and civilian personnel engaged in combat.6  
As the recognized foundation for American behavior in warfare, and an 
underlying basis for many conduct-after-capture training programs, one must 
examine the principles contained in the Geneva Conventions and the applicability 
to asymmetric warfare. 
C. GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
The 1864 Geneva Conference formalized protections for wounded 
soldiers and sailors and included the creation of the International Red Cross.  
The Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded in Time of War provided for 
“…immunity from capture and destruction of establishments for the sick and 
wounded and their personnel; impartial reception and treatment of combatants; 
protection of civilians giving aid to the wounded; and recognition of the Red 
Cross as a means of identifying persons and equipment covered by the 
agreement.”7  The subsequent conference in 1929 introduced The Convention 
Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War in an effort to create a legally 
                                            
5 USAFJAGS, 596. 
6 Ibid., 596-597. 
7 Veterans Administration, 27. 
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binding set of standards between the participating nations for conduct “off” of the 
main battlefield.   
As with all international agreements, a state may be a party to the 
proceedings but not bound to the treaty until obtaining a signature, or interim 
acceptance, and final ratification, or official acceptance, of some or all of the draft 
provisions.  An individual state may sign an agreement, with reservations, but fail 
to ever achieve ratification, as seen in the case of the 1929 prisoner convention.  
The blatant disregard for POW health and safety during the Second World War 
resulted in a call for a reevaluation and reaffirmation of the 1929 Convention’s 
requirements.  The 1949 Geneva Conference developed four new agreements 
including the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GWS), the Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea (GWS-SEA), the Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War (GPW) and the Convention for the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (GC).8  Additionally, in 1979, Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I) and Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict (Protocol II) provide guidance to 
address the changing nature of conflict throughout the world.  Although all four of 
the Conventions and the two Protocols are critical to the well-being of military 
and civilian personnel in wartime, the GPW and Protocol I are the most 
contentious in light of today’s security environment. 
The GPW outlines the rights, responsibilities, and protections afforded to 
POWs regardless of race, nationality, or political or religious belief and “…is an 
agreement between nations; consequently, a PW cannot renounce the rights 
secured for him by the GPW (Article 7) and/or the duties assigned to him 
                                            
8 Ibid., 27-28. 
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(Articles 49-57)...”9  Divided into six sections, the GPW provides specific 
guidelines for both the captor and the POW throughout the stages of the captivity 
cycle.  One of the key areas of controversy surrounding the GPW, particularly in 
view of current events in the WOT in Afghanistan and Iraq, involves the 
determination of who is classified as a combatant and thus eligible for POW 
rights and protections.  “The war on terrorism has blurred the line separating 
renegade criminals and terrorists, who have no legal protections, from regular 
uniformed troops of nations at war, who have special rights specified in the 1929 
and 1949 Geneva Conventions.”10  The Hague Regulations, Geneva 
Conventions, and the Protocol Additions outline the criteria for categorization as 
a combatant, unlawful combatant, or noncombatant.   
1. Combatants 
As per the Hague Regulations (HR) and the four Geneva Conventions, a 
lawful or privileged combatant is an individual authorized “…by competent 
authority of a Party to engage directly in armed conflict.”11  Lawful combatants 
are subdivided into regular and irregular forces.  Regular forces include a 
nation’s armed forces and any attached militia or volunteer forces.  Irregular 
forces include members of militia or volunteer corps groups that are not 
connected to the regular armed forces, including organized resistance 
movements.  Additionally, Protocol 1, Article 43 “Armed Force,” states that: 
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized 
armed forces, groups, and units which are under a command 
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if 
that Party is represented by a government or an authority not 
recognized by an adverse Party.  Such armed forces shall be 
subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall 
enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict.  Members of the armed forces to a Party to a 
                                            
9 U.S. Army Field Manual 21-78, Prisoner of War Resistance, (Washington DC: HQ 
Department of the Army, 1981), 11 [hereafter referred to as FM 21-78, pp.#]. 
10 David Wood, “U.S. POWs Could Face Brutal Treatment in Iraq War,” Newhouse News 
Service, 21 March 2003, 1.  Available [online]: 
http://www.newhousenews.com/archive/wood032103.html [03 March 2004]. 
11 U.S. Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law - The Conduct of Armed Conflict and 
Air Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 19 November 1976), 3-1 
[hereafter referred to as AFP 110-31, pp.#]. 
11 
conflict…are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to 
participate directly in hostilities.12 
To secure combatant status and the associated legal protections, the 
irregular forces must be engaged in an international armed conflict and meet all 
of the following criteria provided in GPW Article 4A(2)(a-d): be under the 
command of a person responsible for his or her subordinates; have a fixed 
distinctive symbol or insignia recognizable from a distance; carry arms openly; 
and conduct operations in accordance with LOAC.  
Neither the 1907 Hague Regulations nor the Third Geneva 
Convention explicitly stipulate that a member of regular armed forces has 
to fulfill the four criteria in order to be a prisoner of war in the event of 
capture.  On the contrary, the four criteria, including wearing a uniform or 
at least a distinctive sign, are mentioned only for irregular forces and not 
for regular ones.”13   
Combatants engaged in evasion or escape activities may don enemy clothing or 
feign civilian status without retribution under the condition that the evader does 
not attack the adversary or engage in military operations.  Protocol I, Article 44 
“Combatants and Prisoners of War,” which the U.S. is a party to but not signatory 
of, provides additional guidance to maintain combatant status: 
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the 
effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in 
an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.  
Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflict 
where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant 
cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a 
combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms 
openly: during each military engagement, and during such time as 
he is visible to an adversary while he is engaged in a military 
                                            
12 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) (8 June 1977), 19-20.  
Available [online]: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm] [22 July 2004] [hereafter referred 
to as Protocol I, pp.#]. 
13 Toni Pfanner, “Military Uniforms and the Law of War,” International Review of the Red 




deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to 
participate.14 
As reported by various American news agencies, President George W. 
Bush and his administration advocate that enemy militants captured in the WOT 
do not merit the legal status and rights of combatants due to the inability to meet 
the four customary irregular forces’ requirements.  According to Robert K. 
Goldman, a legal professor at the American University’s Washington College, 
President Bush is setting a precedent that could harm American and 
Multinational forces if captured in current and future operations.  “American 
special forces -- who also frequently wear civilian clothes -- could be considered 
‘unlawful combatants’ with no legal rights, and could be captured and executed 
along with regular troops denied the status of combatants.”15  Professor 
Goldman’s assertion is only partially correct depending upon the activity that the 
individual Special Operations Force (SOF) member conducts while out of battle 
dress uniform.   
SOF serve as a unique and essential element of America’s warfighting 
capability that provides commanders with an elusive, independent, highly trained, 
and mobile force capable of performing sensitive and demanding aerial, ground, 
and sea-based missions.  SOF personnel frequently conduct a variety of 
missions worldwide completely devoid of U.S. affiliation.  While espionage and 
sabotage conducted by a “uniformed” member on behalf of a Party to a conflict 
are within the legal boundaries of LOAC, a soldier performing these acts out of 
uniform, e.g. while wearing civilian clothing, or in a disguise forfeits his or her 
privileged status according to the HR and GPW.  Consequently, the individual is 
not granted POW status if captured and may legally be prosecuted as a common 
criminal according to the local laws of the captor.   
With President Bush’s declaration of a “war on terrorism,” the U.S. is 
engaged in a declared state of international armed conflict with non-state, 
transnational actors and any state or non-state entities that sponsor terrorist 
                                            
14 Protocol I, 20. 
15 Wood, “U.S. POWs,” 3. 
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organizations.  In a conflict against an unconventional threat, American and 
multinational forces may resort to combat tactics and techniques deemed 
inappropriate under current rules for conventional warfare.  Although SOF are not 
required by international law to wear distinctive uniforms or adhere to Service 
grooming standards to maintain combatant status, the wear of non-standard 
uniforms is not appropriate for all situations.  Finally, while SOF are engaged in 
what the U.S. deems a legitimately declared armed conflict, personnel may still 
forfeit protected status if involved in perfidious acts.  Perfidy involves an act that 
“…invites the confidence of the adversary that he is entitled to protection or is 
obliged to accord protection under international law, combined with intent to 
betray that confidence… such acts include… the feigning by combatants of 
civilian, noncombatant status.”16  Any military member that commits perfidy 
during an international armed conflict assumes the status of an unlawful 
combatant. 
2. Unlawful Combatants 
Unlawful, or unprivileged, combatants include privileged combatants who 
do not comply with the customary requirements, individuals who directly engage 
in combat operations without authorization, and noncombatants who misuse their 
protected status to participate in armed conflict.17  The rights and protections 
afforded by the Conventions apply only to members of “state” entities that are 
bound to, and willing to abide by, the agreements.  One could argue that, in 
addition to failing to meet the four customary criteria, terrorist and insurgent 
groups do not have authorization from a competent authority or maintain the 
required “state” status for recognition by the Geneva Conventions.  Terrorists 
actively target noncombatant civilians, unarmed military personnel, and facilities 
or assets that possess symbolic value.  The attacks on Khobar Towers, the USS 
Cole, and the Pentagon demonstrate an aggressive shift from purely civilian, 
noncombatant targets to operations directed against sizable military assets.  
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Terrorists hit U.S. targets and then seek shelter among noncombatants or in 
facilities on the restricted targeting list, i.e., hospitals and religious structures.   
Terrorists and insurgents do not warrant combatant status and, likewise, 
are not obliged to afford their hostages the rights and protections of the GPW 
and GC.  Along similar lines, hostile governments that detain American military 
and civilian personnel during “peacetime” are also not required, per the GPW 
criteria, to extend special rights and privileges to the detainees.  Peacetime 
government detentions, however, generally receive greater international scrutiny 
and failure to provide cursory protections can lead to severe political and 
economic repercussions.  Any state or nonstate actor that engages in the 
prohibited act of taking of hostages is considered an unlawful combatant, as per 
the dictates of Protocol I, Article 75.   
3. Noncombatants 
The final category, noncombatants, includes civilians, civilians 
accompanying military forces, combatants who are unable to participate in the 
hostilities such as POWs and the wounded or sick, and retained personnel 
including military medics and chaplains.  Retained personnel, while not 
considered POWs, warrant the rights and protections of the GWS, GWS-SEA, 
and GPW.18  The DoD’s push to outsource and privatize many of the military’s 
support functions resulted in the unintended consequence of an increased 
number of civilian governmental employees and contractors working on or near 
the battlespace who, though classified as noncombatants, are entitled to POW 
status per GPW, Article 4A(4).  Media correspondents that travel with military 
units, referred to during the WOT as “embedded reporters,” are also granted 
POW status and must carry the Geneva Conventions Identification Card.  
Despite the special provisions for retained personnel in the Geneva Conventions, 
medics and chaplains historically received the same harsh treatment and sub-
standard living conditions allocated to regular combatant POWs.   
Journalists operating in the conflict zone not assigned to military units are 
considered civilians under Protocol I, Article 79 “Measures of Protection for                                             
18 Ibid., 3-3. 
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Journalists” and do not warrant POW status.  Additionally, members of 
nongovernmental or private voluntary organizations (NGO/PVOs) are not entitled 
to POW status but are increasingly falling into enemy hands with little to no 
training on how to deal with captivity situations.  Noncombatants are 
progressively more the focus of terrorist operations.  “Terrorists who do not care 
about the laws of warfare target innocent noncombatants.  Indeed, their goal is to 
maximize the number of deaths and injuries among the most vulnerable civilians, 
such as children, women and the elderly… The terrorist leaders - who do not 
wear military uniforms - deliberately hide among noncombatants.”19  
Unfortunately, the authors of Protocol I, II, and the four Conventions never 
envisioned the asymmetric threats that American forces face today. 
4. Relevance of the Geneva Conventions in the Asymmetric 
Environment 
As the U.S. increases its forward posture and presence to pursue security 
and stability operations worldwide, one must consider the applicability of the 
Geneva Conventions to the future security environment.  Critics argue that the 
Conventions now benefit the enemy captors more than the captives.  “The 
Geneva Conventions are so outdated and are written so broadly that they have 
become a sword used by terrorists to kill civilians, rather than a shield to protect 
civilians from terrorists.  These international laws have become part of the 
problem, rather than part of the solution.”20  In particular, terrorists frequently 
initiate attacks against U.S. military forces while surrounded by noncombatants 
or from restricted civilian facilities, i.e., hospitals, schools, mosques, etc., in the 
knowledge that America abides by LOAC and will hesitate to immediately 
retaliate.  If the American forces legitimately strike back and inadvertently harm a 
civilian, the terrorists can manipulate the international media to condemn the 
strike.  Against an asymmetric threat, one can expect neither reciprocity nor a 
“civilized” standard of conduct on the battlefield: 
Terrorism and non-international armed conflict exacerbate the 
situation.  It is extraordinarily difficult to exercise a high degree of 
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care while effectively combating terrorists or rebels who are 
intentionally hiding their activities and identities.  Indeed, they have 
little reason to distinguish themselves from the civilian population, 
for their actions are already criminal.  Again, those charged with 
prosecuting the campaign against them have an incentive in such 
circumstances to interpret the care standard very liberally.21   
American and coalition forces, indoctrinated and trained to strictly follow the 
many guidelines contained with LOAC, are predictable and easier to target.  The 
application of LOAC and the Geneva Conventions is extremely difficult against 
terrorist groups.  “Instead, the organization [al Qaeda] is conducting a violent 
campaign of isolated acts form many locations against numerous countries with 
forces under varying degrees of control from the al [Qaeda] leadership… al 
[Qaeda] controls no territory and because the GWOT is being carried out beyond 
the borders of the States conducting it.”22  The lack of a defined battlespace in 
the WOT, and the evolving nature of the threat, increases the opportunities for 
U.S. and multinational assets to fall into capture situations not addressed by the 
Geneva Conventions and the Protocols.   
A U.S. military or civilian person separated from friendly control and forced 
to survive, evade, or escape, also known as an isolated person, is classified as a 
POW, detainee, or hostage when captured by an adversary.  The GPW contains 
the rights and privileges afforded to POWs, including immunity from criminal 
prosecution for legitimate acts of war conducted during wartime or a declared 
international conflict.  The captor is authorized to detain the POW until the 
cessation of formal hostilities.  POWs are authorized to use force during escape 
and rescue activities.  During peacetime or conflicts conducted without a formal 
declaration of war, however, captives are considered “detainees” that are subject 
to the local laws of the captor and authorized to use force only in self-defense.  
The detainee is held in custody for alleged violations of local or international 
laws, even if the military actions occurred under the auspices of a United Nations 
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Resolution or other state-sanctioned military operation.  As a “blue helmet” 
United Nations Force member or “non-blue helmet” United Nation Expert on 
Mission, the captive is immune from detention under the 1946 Convention on 
Privileges and Immunity for United Nations and authorized to use force in self-
defense but not for evasion or rescue efforts.  If capture while engaged in a state-
sponsored military action that is not supported by the United Nations, the 
detainee lacks protected legal status and is not authorized to use force during 
evasion or rescue attempts.  Finally, if captured by a non-governmental entity or 
terrorist organization and held as leverage in the pursuance of a politically-
motivated objective, the individual is considered a hostage and authorized to use 
force only in self-defense.  While Protocol I and II condemn the taking of 
hostages for any reason neither document stipulates any protection mechanism 
or expected minimum standards of treatment for the detainee or hostage.23 
In its present form, the Geneva Conventions do not adequately address 
the needs of detainees and hostages or provide a mechanism for sovereign 
states to prosecute non-state transnational actors for criminal acts.  Although the 
legal community adopted the “International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages” in 1979, subsequently supported under U.S. law “18 USC 1203 Act for 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking” in 1984, many 
legitimate governments do not have the capability or resources to ensure the 
safety of foreign nationals living and working within their borders.  Americans 
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM face the possibility of capture and 
execution by Iraqi extremists.  While the U.S. will make every effort to secure the 
return of its citizens, official government policy prevents the making of 
concessions to terrorists.  Combatants held hostage or detained while 
participating in the WOT, and other future joint operations, cannot expect neither 
POW status under the Geneva Conventions or protection under U.S. domestic 
law.  The international community may need to reevaluate the rights, protections, 
and restrictions contained within the Geneva Conventions.  A potential 
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amendment of the Conventions would consequently impact America’s domestic 
military law.  Since the primary statute that regulates the actions of military 
personnel is based on the Geneva Conventions, one must question if the articles 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice pertaining to wartime conduct apply to 
non-traditional situations.   
D. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 
To ensure military and civilian members of the Armed Forces comply with 
the dictates of the Geneva Conventions and other international laws, the United 
States Congress enacted a statue called the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ).  The President of the United States, in his or her role as Commander-In-
Chief, must enforce military discipline by executing the criminal law provisions of 
the UCMJ.   
[A]ctive duty soldiers are subject to the UCMJ at all times, on and 
off post; reserve component soldiers are subject to military law 
when in federal service; and civilians may be subject to military law 
when serving with or accompanying an armed force “in time of 
war.”  The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled ‘in time of war’ to mean a 
congressionally declared war, and not contingency operations such 
as Southwest Asia, Somalia or Haiti.24   
Military personnel are not exempt from UCMJ jurisdiction even after the 
transition from combatant to POW status.  UCMJ Article 99 “Misbehavior before 
the Enemy,” Article 100 “Subordinate Compelling Surrender,” Article 104 “Aiding 
the Enemy,” and Article 105 “Misconduct as a Prisoner,” stipulate that members 
of the United States Armed Forces will be held legally accountable for offenses 
conducted during hostilities including, but not limited to, surrendering to the 
enemy, compelling the senior ranking person to surrender, aiding the enemy by 
voluntarily providing information of intelligence value, mistreating fellow POWs, 
and seeking special treatment from the enemy.  A determined legal professional 
could argue that the wording of Articles 99, 100, 104, and 105 preclude their use 
against offenses in an asymmetric environment due to the inclusion of the phrase 
“in time of war.”  In addition to the legal constraints of the UCMJ, U.S. personnel 
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must also deal with the restrictions imposed by its allies in the form of Status of 
Forces Agreements (SOFA).   
SOFAs are negotiated relationships between two countries wherein 
the host nation accords certain rights and responsibilities to 
members of U.S. Forces and accompanying civilians… the host 
nation may still retain the right to prosecute U.S. personnel for 
offenses that are either exclusive violations of host nation law or 
those over which the host nation has primary concurrent 
jurisdiction.25   
As the U.S. transitions from a strictly conventional to a “swift defeat” 
campaign stance against a variety of adversaries, the UCMJ may require revision 
of several articles currently tailored for traditional large scale warfare. 
E. CODE OF CONDUCT 
Although the Geneva Conventions and UCMJ provide the international 
and domestic legal and punitive guidelines for conduct in battle, Service 
members are rarely prepared for the physical and mental challenges of captivity.  
American soldiers, sailors, and airmen entering into the Korean Conflict lacked 
the tools need to deal with the harsh realities of enemy manipulation and 
exploitation.  The six articles of the CoC, signed into existence in 1955, 
reinforced basic American ideals and established a guide for standards of 
personal behavior expected of all American POWs throughout the stages of 
captivity.  Although strictly a moral guide, the CoC is designed to help U.S. 
military personnel survive enemy captivity with honor and adhere to the legal 
responsibilities of a POW contained within the GPW and UCMJ.  An examination 
of the origins of the CoC reveals that although the basic spirit applies to non-
POW captivity situations, several of the articles provide guidance that could 
prove detrimental in hostage and detainee situations.   
1. History 
During times of conflict, military personnel inherently assume the risk of 
becoming potential sources of information or propaganda for the enemy.  After 
the Second World War, the role of POWs gradually shifted from expendable 
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asset or slave laborer to potential sources of information, propaganda tools, and 
students of indoctrination.  German interrogators successfully demonstrated the 
ability to extract information from American POWs without excessive use of 
physical force.  Psychological manipulation proved far more effective in obtaining 
accurate information than physical torture.  The average U.S. soldier during this 
period in military history received little to no training on resistance methodology 
and relied solely on fighting spirit and ideals to survive.  The Chinese 
interrogators during the Korean Conflict built upon the lessons learned by 
Germany and explored beyond simple information extraction into the concept of 
indoctrination or “brainwashing.”  The Chinese used the intricate American 
soldiers’ minds as a testing ground for advanced manipulation techniques and 
set a new standard for exploitation.  The U.S. government recognized the 
vulnerability of military personnel to exploitation and the resultant political and 
military consequences.  “Experiences in World War II stimulated much thinking 
and some developmental work with respect to preparing US Service personnel to 
continue to fight -- to live up to American ideals -- in the event of capture.  The 
furor over the Korean experience gave tremendous impetus to this 
development.”26   
In 1954, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson assembled a committee to 
analyze the problems encountered in the North Korean and Chinese--operated 
POW camps.  Although the Services separately maintained internal regulations 
and guidance governing POW conduct, the Armed Forces did not have a single, 
over-arching mechanism to help Service members survive against the newly 
emerging communist threat.  The 1955 Defense Advisory Committee on 
Prisoners of War developed a six article “code of conduct” based on legal 
requirements and American values.  The Committee presented the proposed 
code to Secretary Wilson just two weeks after the United States officially ratified 
the 1949 GPW.  President Eisenhower approved the code and issued Executive 
Order (E.O.) 10631 charging all members of the military to live up to the 
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standards contained within the six articles of the Code of Conduct.  “By creating 
a code simple enough for everyone to understand, the American armed services 
recognized the need to formalize ideals in order for POWs to share the risks in 
enemy captivity equitably.”27  In addition to the six articles, E.O. 10631 further 
stated that “…each member of the Armed Forces liable to capture shall be 
provided with specific training and instruction designed to better equip him to 
counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him, and shall be fully instructed 
as to the behavior and obligations expected of him during combat or captivity.”28  
Secretary Wilson, in an 18 August 1955 memorandum to the Service 
Secretaries, reemphasized the importance of the CoC and outlined specific 
subjects required in the Service training programs.   
Since 1955, E.O. 10631 evolved through several amendments to reflect 
changes in the governmental structure or political climate.  The first change in 
1967, E.O. 11382, replaced all references of the Secretary of Treasury within 
E.O. 10631 to the Secretary of Transportation.  The exploitation of American 
POWs in the Indochina War era by North Vietnamese and Chinese interrogators, 
and subsequent public outcry, resulted in a change to the wording of the articles.  
The role of POWs changed once again from purely sources of information to 
instruments of propaganda activity.  “Showing the prisoner to the captor’s ‘home 
folks’…provides living proof of the vulnerability of the prisoner…the lift to the 
morale of the captor people stems from the display….”29  The North Vietnamese, 
and later the Iraqis during Operation DESERT STORM, used the American 
POWs to simultaneously boost the morale of their own people while attempting to 
demoralize the American public.  Enemy exploitation of military personnel, during 
both peace and wartime, typically provokes a strong negative reaction within the 
American public that the enemy can use to gain a political advantage.   
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The 1976 DoD Defense Review Committee for the Code of Conduct 
reassessed and recommended changes to Article V, implemented in E.O. 12017, 
following the experiences of POWs in Vietnam against a communist threat 
employing asymmetric interrogation tactics and techniques.  The third 
amendment, E.O. 12633 signed in 1988, rendered the CoC gender neutral in 
acknowledgement of the increased presence of females in the Armed Forces.  
The most recent amendment, E.O. 13286, reflects the 2003 creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and subsequent transition of the Coast 
Guard from the Department of Transportation to the DHS.  According to the 
National Archives and Records Administration, CoC training is the only known 
component of military training that is mandated or supported by a Presidential 
Executive Order.  Despite the evolution of the security environment, the DoD 
continues to use the six articles of the CoC as amended over sixteen years ago.  
The CoC articles, and a brief explanation of each, used by the senior leaders and 
warfighters of today are as follows: 
The Code of Conduct 
Article I: I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard 
my country and our way of life.  I am prepared to give my life in 
their defense. 
All men and women in the Armed Forces have the duty at all times 
and under all circumstances to oppose the enemies of the US and 
support its national interests.  In training or in combat, alone or with 
others, while evading capture or enduring captivity, this duty 
belongs to each American defending our nation regardless of 
circumstances. 
Article II: I will never surrender of my own free will.  If in 
command, I will never surrender the members of my command 
while they still have the means to resist. 
As an individual, a member of the Armed Forces may never 
voluntarily surrender.  When isolated and no longer able to inflict 
casualties on the enemy, the American soldier has an obligation to 
evade capture and rejoin friendly forces.  Only when evasion by an 
individual is impossible and further fighting would lead only to death 
with no significant loss of the enemy should only consider 
surrender.  With all reasonable means of resistance exhausted and 
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with certain death the only alternative, capture does not imply 
dishonor. 
Article III: If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means 
available.  I will make every effort to escape and aid others to 
escape.  I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the 
enemy. 
The duty of a member of the Armed Forces to use all means 
available to resist the enemy is not lessened by the misfortune of 
captivity.  Unless it is essential to the life or welfare of the person or 
another prisoner of war or to the success of efforts to resist or 
escape, a POW must neither seek nor accept special favors or 
privileges.  One such privilege is called parole.  Parole is a promise 
by a prisoner of war to a captor to fulfill certain conditions - such as 
agreeing not to escape nor to fight again once released - in return 
for such favors as relief from physical bondage, improved food and 
living condition, or repatriation ahead of the sick, injured, or longer-
held prisoners. 
Article IV: If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with 
my fellow prisoners.  I will give no information or take part in 
any action which might be harmful to my comrades.  If I am 
senior, I will take command.  If not, I will obey the lawful orders 
of those appointed over me and will back them up in every 
way. 
Informing, or any other action to the detriment of a fellow prisoner, 
is despicable and is expressly forbidden.  Officers and 
noncommissioned officers of the United States must continue to 
carry out their responsibilities and exercise their authority in 
captivity.  The senior, regardless of Service, must accept 
command.   
Article V: When questioned, should I become a prisoner of 
war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and 
date of birth.  I will evade answering further questions to the 
utmost of my ability.  I will make no oral or written statements 
disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause. 
When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the Geneva 
Conventions and this Code to give name, rank, service number and 
date of birth.  The prisoner should make every effort to avoid giving 
the captor and additional information.  Every POW should 
recognize that any confession signed or any statement made may 
be used by the enemy as false evidence that the person is a "war 
criminal" rather than a POW.  Several countries have made 
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reservations to the Geneva Convention in which they assert that a 
"war criminal" conviction deprives the convicted individual of 
prisoner of war status, removes that person from protection under 
the Geneva Convention, and revokes all rights to repatriation until a 
prison sentence is served. 
Article VI: I will never forget that I am an American fighting for 
freedom, responsible for my action, and dedicated to the 
principles which made my country free.  I will trust in my God 
and in the United States of America.   
A member of the Armed Forces remains responsible for personal 
actions at all times.  A member of the Armed Forces who is 
captured has a continuing obligation to resist and to remain loyal to 
country, Service, unit and fellow prisoners.30 
The 1977 and 1988 wording changes maintain the CoC’s alignment with 
the Geneva Conventions and the articles of the UCMJ.  Although the Geneva 
Conventions contain special provisions for chaplains and medical personnel, all 
Service members must adhere to the CoC without exception.  Since the wording 
refers directly to Cold War-era POW situations and threats, many Service 
members question the CoC’s applicability to the growing number of asymmetric 
detention and hostage events.   
2. Application of Code of Conduct to Detention and Hostage 
Situations 
The ever evolving nature of the battlespace since the Second World War 
exposes more personnel to the risk of being detained or held hostage by entities 
that do not adhere to the Geneva Conventions.  From the late 1960s through the 
mid-1970s, American military and civilian personnel residing overseas lived with 
the constant threat of abduction by hostile foreign government entities or militant 
extremists outside of the context of a declared war.  Due to the increased activity 
of terrorists, the 1976 DoD Defense Review Committee discussed the application 
of the CoC to “peacetime” captivity.  The Committee concluded that despite the 
direct references to “prisoner of war,” the spirit and intent of the CoC applied to 
all captivity situations.  One critic, however, argued during the early 1980s that:  
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Captivity may vary from a spontaneous hijacking by a psychopath 
to the carefully orchestrated takeover of an embassy by a foreign 
government.  Such unstructured and diverse detentions make the 
code extremely difficult to apply.  In most cases the captor is 
already outside the law and the hostage’s fate and treatment will 
depend on other deterring factors such as unfavorable publicity, 
fear of reprisal, or promise of concessions. Consequently, arbitrary 
application of the articles will often not serve the best interests of 
either the hostage or his government.31 
One must consider several unique factors faced in the changing security 
environment.  Members in hostage and detention situations may not have the 
means or opportunity to avoid capture or attempt to evade as stipulated in Article 
II.  The ability to establish a chain of command or make the decision to surrender 
or evade is further complicated by the presence of civilian employees, 
contractors, and multinational partners with different personal convictions and 
levels of training on determining the acceptable point of surrender.  Article III is 
extremely difficult for inexperienced military members with only the basic CoC 
knowledge to apply to non-POW captivity circumstances.  Many entry level CoC 
training programs do not address the methodology for resisting and escaping in 
hostage and detainee situations or discuss the conditions under a member of the 
Armed Forces may accept parole.  The influence of television and movies further 
confuses young officers and enlisted personnel as to appropriate and realistic 
resistance postures or even the UCMJ definition of “parole” versus TNT’s Law & 
Order police interpretation.  “Resisting by all means available” can result in 
severe physical abuse or death in hostage situations.  While attempts to escape 
are not advised during hostage situations, individuals who try to escape during a 
governmental detention may be in violation of local criminal laws and subject to 
prosecution.  Although the Geneva Conventions provide specific guidance on the 
establishment of a chain of command in a POW camp, Article IV is difficult to 
enforce in an interagency and multinational environment.   
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Article V’s requirement to provide name, rank, service number, and date of 
birth, commonly referred to as the “Big 4” by military personnel, and evade 
providing additional information to the best of one’s ability is unquestionably one 
of the most confusing and contentious issues in the asymmetric environment.  
“Big 4 and No More,” a common memory aid in basic CoC training programs, 
prevents the detainee or hostage from establishing a level of rapport with the 
captor, excluding the compromise of sensitive military operations or information, 
that might facilitate release.  The original intent behind the 1949 GPW’s 
requirement for the “Big 4” centered on the determination of combatant and POW 
status.  The 1976 DoD Defense Review Committee changed the wording of 
Article V, from “bound to give” to “required to give,” as a compromise between 
the legal obligations of the GPW and UCMJ and the realities of prisoner 
interrogation and exploitation.   
The ability of a POW, detainee, or hostage to successfully withhold 
personal information significantly diminished with the advent of the Internet.  The 
DoD’s use of a member’s Social Security Number as the military Service Number 
enables a captor to access and exploit personal information through the Internet 
and subjects the captive to possible identity theft and fraud.  During the early 
stages of the WOT, the Pentagon also wrestled with the issue of the personal 
information data microchip embedded in all Geneva Convention Identification 
(GCI) Cards, also known as the Common Access Card.  American SOF 
personnel operating in Afghanistan removed and destroyed the microchips due 
to concerns that a computer savvy terrorist could retrieve and manipulate 
information contained on the microchip.  While highly unlikely that a terrorist 
could successfully extract harmful data from the GCI card microchip, SOF 
personnel understood the importance of safeguarding personal and operational 
information.  Without the benefit of the advanced CoC training courses, most 
DoD personnel are left wandering through the captivity minefield with few tools to 
deal with the physical, psychological, and legal challenges. 
Due to the many uncertainties and trials of captivity as a detainee or 
hostage, the DoD decided to maintain the 1988 version of the CoC as a moral 
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guide versus a code of law and adjust the associated training to address the 
changing threat environment.  “…although designed for evasion and prisoner of 
war (POW) situations, the spirit and intent of the CoC are applicable to Service 
members subjected to other hostile detention, and such Service members should 
conduct themselves consistently in a manner that avoids discrediting themselves 
and their country.”32  Unfortunately, as demonstrated in every major conflict since 
Vietnam, the enemy has successfully captured and exploited personnel deemed 
“low value or low risk of capture” targets.  The distributed battlespace does not 
have an established “front line,” thus increasing the challenge for commanders 
attempting to determine who is low or high risk of capture.  Although all military 
personnel are required to receive basic CoC training at some point in their 
career, currently only individuals deemed high value or risk receive the advanced 
training needed to clearly understand how to appropriately apply the CoC across 
the captivity spectrum.   
F. SERVICE REGULATIONS, TRAINING, AND REALITY 
As the international law community contemplates the viability of the 
Geneva Conventions within an asymmetric environment, the DoD must examine 
the effectiveness of existing Service regulations and training programs.  Prior to 
1955, the individual Services developed separate procedures and training to 
address the SERE challenges encountered during the Second World War and 
the Korean Conflict, all without top-level DoD guidance or deconfliction.  The Air 
Force created a survival, evasion, and escape training school in 1949 and added 
resistance to the curriculum in 1953.  Although E.O. 10631 established the 
requirement for each Service to have a CoC training program, senior DoD 
leadership left the Services to interpret the meaning and application of the CoC in 
a wartime environment.  Secretary Wilson’s 1955 memorandum specified the 
inclusion of: 
[E]ducation in the basic truths and advantages of our democratic 
institutions and in the fallacies of Communism.  Strong, effective                                             
32 U.S. Department of Defense Instruction 1300.21, Code of Conduct (CoC) Training and 
Education, (Washington, DC: ASD(ISA). 2001), 9.  Available [online]: 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/130021.htm [12 August 2004] [hereafter referred to 
as DoDI 1300.21, pp. #]. 
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leadership, group loyalties and esprit de corps must be fostered by 
every means.  Each individual must be fully instructed as to his 
conduct and proper courses of action when faced with capture and 
as a prisoner of war.  Individuals and units must be trained as to 
their proper procedures when isolated, surrounded or cut off.  All 
must learn the methods by which enemy interrogation and 
indoctrination are resisted or avoided.  Specialized training 
appropriate to service and individual requirements must be given in 
evasion and escape, resistance, prisoner organization and 
survival.33 
The Navy, Marine Corps, and Army created separate survival training 
courses during the late 1950s.  The resultant disparities in the four training 
programs revealed the basic philosophical differences between the Services.  To 
further complicate the issue, the 1 May 1960 “peacetime detention” of U-2 pilot 
Francis Gary Powers demonstrated the ability of an adversary to use a captive to 
politically humiliate an opponent at the international level and the inadequacy of 
CoC training for hostile peacetime government detentions.  While the Navy 
added resistance to the program in 1962, the Marine Corps did not develop a 
resistance curriculum until 1978.   
Despite the release of DoD Directive (DoDD) 1300.7, 8 July 1964, 
Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct, Service members 
entered Vietnam with different and often conflicting instructions on POW 
responsibilities and conduct.  The training inequalities created hardships for and 
cleavages between some multi-Service POW camp members.  The DoD added 
to the POWs’ confusion with the release of additional guidance: 
…on 3 July 1970, DOD policy was announced in a letter to the 
Armed Forces, “The U.S. approves any honorable release and 
prefers sick and wounded and long term prisoners first.”  
Additionally, limited parole against escape is permitted for specific 
limited purposes as authorized by the senior officer exercising 
command authority.34   
                                            
33 Charles E. Wilson, “Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of 
Conduct,” (18 August 1955), 1. 
34 AFP 110-31, 13-7. 
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The overall POW community morale and cohesion suffered as new 
captives entered the camps with different training and regulatory guidance.  As 
with the Korean Conflict, the DoD convened a Defense Review Committee to 
capture the lessons learned from the Vietnam War POW experience and identify 
the strengths and weaknesses of the CoC training program.  The 1976 DoD 
Defense Review Committee, in addition to the revision of CoC Article V, 
recommended the standardization of all Service training through a single 
Executive Agent (EA).  As the Secretary of Defense’s EA for joint escape and 
evasion since 1953, the Air Force seemed the logical candidate to also serve as 
the EA for CoC training in 1979.   
The increasing rate of peacetime government detentions and terrorist 
hostage incidents throughout the 1970s and early 1980s led to the revision of 
DoDD 1300.7, including guidance and training material on non-POW capture 
situations and the creation of a stratified risk-based training system known as 
Level A, B, and C.35  All through the 1980s, the DoD made significant strides in 
CoC training, Personnel Recovery (PR) capabilities and procedures, and 
prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) accountability and repatriation 
issues.  The mid-1980s also witnessed the consolidation of the Navy and Marine 
Corps schools and the creation of the first Army SERE training course.  In 1991, 
the Air Force introduced the Joint Service SERE Agency (JSSA) as lead for 
POW/MIA affairs.  Three years later, JSSA assumed responsibility for all PR 
issues.  Despite the demonstrated need for integration, the Services continued to 
maintain separate SERE training schools because of an inability to overcome 
cultural differences and parochial attitudes.  The world of PR caught the attention 
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 1996 with the publication of 
Title 10, United States Code Sections 1501-1513, “The Missing Persons Act 
(MPA)”:   
The MPA places…requirements on the [Secretary of Defense] 
SECDEF.  First, the SECDEF must establish within OSD an office 
having the responsibility for DoD policy relating to missing persons.  
                                            
35 The details of training Level A, B, and C are contained in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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Second, the SECDEF is required to establish policies throughout 
DoD for personnel recovery (including search, rescue, escape, and 
evasion.)  The establishment of the Defense Prisoner of 
War/Missing Personnel Office and the issuance of various 
publications concerning personnel recovery have satisfied these 
two requirements.36 
The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) provided 
oversight and integration for the Services and served as the mechanism to 
ensure “…coordination among DoD, [Joint Chiefs of Staff] JCS, Combatant 
Commands, and the interagency community.”37  Due to Service restructuring in 
the late 1990s, JSSA combined with several other organizations to form the Joint 
Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), subordinate to the United States Joint 
Forces Command.  As the DoD’s lead for joint PR support, JPRA assumed the 
responsibility for CoC training and works in coordination with DPMO.   
Although the Services are reluctant to change the content of the CoC, the 
recognition of an expanding security environment forced OSD/DPMO to revise 
DoDD 1300.7 in December of 2000 and create two new DoD instructions (DoDI).  
The current version of DoDD 1300.7 is more succinct than the 1988 edition and 
authorizes the implementation of DoDI 1300.21, 8 January 2001, Training and 
Education to Support the Code of Conduct.  DoDI 1300.21 contains an updated 
and expanded version of the CoC training guidance for wartime and peacetime 
captivity, previously included as enclosures to DoDD 1300.7.  The increased role 
of civilians and contractors in contingency operations led to the creation of the 
second document, DoDI 1300.23, 20 August 2003, Isolated Personnel Training 
for DoD Civilians and Contractors.   
DoDI 1300.21 provides formal guidance to help the isolated person apply 
the CoC to wartime, peacetime governmental detention, and hostage situations.  
As discussed earlier, POWs, detainees, and hostages are restrained by different 
                                            
36 “Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 2310.5 ‘Accounting For Missing Persons,’” Fact 
Sheet, 31 January 2000.  Available [online]: 
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Camp/9276/dod_missing_persons.html [12 July 2004]. 
37 Dan Baumgartner, OSD/DPMO Personnel Recovery Policy Directorate Briefing, 22 March 
2004, Slide 9. 
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sets of legal implications and captor expectations.  Subsequently, the guidance 
contained in DoDI 1300.21 is distinctly different and often contradictory for each 
captivity situation.  Since a very small percentage of DoD personnel receive 
advanced SERE training, the majority of captured members will turn to the only 
known frame of reference, the six articles of the CoC, for all captivity situations.  
To further complicate the issue, each Service maintains separate CoC training 
regulations that, while in compliance with the OSD-level directive and instruction, 
provide different levels of emphasis and guidance. 
The United States Air Force (USAF) supplements the OSD guidance with 
Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 16-13, 1 March 2000, Survival, Escape, 
Resistance, and Escape (SERE) and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2209, 28 
February 1994, Survival and Code of Conduct Training.  The Air Force 
documents strive to instill within each Airman the knowledge, confidence, and 
motivation to survive and return with honor from POW, detainee, or hostage 
situations.  All USAF members receive initial CoC training at the Basic Military 
Training School (BMTS), Officer Training School (OTS), Reserve Officer Training 
Corps (ROTC) programs, or the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) and 
usually review the CoC again at subsequent Profession Military Education (PME) 
schools.  Unlike the other Service documents, the USAF includes sections on 
legal obligation for self and family, personal physical readiness, and self-study 
requirements prior to deployments.  Additionally, the Air Force is the only Service 
that recruits, trains and employs SERE specialists for the duration of their career.   
United States Army Regulation (AR) 350-30, 10 December 1985, Code of 
Conduct, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Training, prepares 
the soldier for his or her responsibilities under the CoC.  One of the more 
thorough and detailed Service-level CoC regulations, AR 350-30 is the only 
document that explores in detail the interconnected relationship between the 
CoC, GPW, and the UCMJ.  The Army provides a standardization mechanism for 
subordinate units by specifying the contents of CoC training. 
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The United States Navy Operational Instruction (OPNAVINST) 1000.24B, 
12 May 1989, Code of Conduct Training consists of two introductory pages and 
an attached copy of the 1988 DoDD 1300.7.  Although the Navy and Marine 
Corps share the same SERE training schools, the Marine Corps maintains 
separate CoC training guidance.  Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3460.1A, 11 June 
1990, Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of 
Conduct, takes the guidance provided in DoDI 1300.21 and interweaves wording 
that reflects the Marine Corps spirit.  MCO 3460.2, 2 December 2002, Policy for 
Personnel Recovery and Repatriation provides additional guidance that is well-
written and geared toward future joint operations. 
OSD’s efforts to standardize CoC training in preparation for joint 
operations and capture situations are hindered by the maintenance of separate 
Service regulatory guidance and SERE training schools.  Although few disagree 
that CoC training is an essential tool on the battlefield, junior and mid-level 
officers and enlisted personnel assert, as discussed in Chapter Four, that the 
CoC and its associated training are due for another intensive review.   
G. CONCLUSION 
Despite the increasing rate of detention and hostage situations since the 
1970’s, the international community has yet to provide a comprehensive legal 
framework for protecting Service members participating in both traditional and 
asymmetric warfare.  Due to the nature of transnational terrorist and insurgent 
threats, it may not be possible to formally establish an enforceable minimum 
standard of acceptable behavior during military engagements or for treatment of 
captured personnel.  U.S. military and civilian personnel must enter the 
battlespace with a clear understanding that the traditional rights, privileges, and 
protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions may not, and probably will not, 
be provided by the captor.  As America approaches the NMS arena, the DoD 
must compensate for the lack of effective international protection by designing a 
flexible conduct-after-capture training program for the Joint Force that addresses 
the rapidly changing spectrum of captivity. 
 
33 
III. DEFINING THE FUTURE COMPONENTS OF WARFARE 
A. OVERVIEW 
With the end of the Cold War, and subsequent collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, American military efforts now concentrate on a rapidly changing 
list of transnational challenges that require senior policy makers and military 
leaders to reconsider how to more effectively utilize limited military resources.  “In 
the present era, the region of the world of most concern to the United States may 
change dramatically from month to month.  In addition, issues or nations that 
were very far down on the list of priorities may quickly emerge at the top of the 
list...”38  To achieve full spectrum dominance across a wide range of conflict 
situations, the U.S. must transform the defensive, reactive capabilities of existing 
political, economic, and military tools into an offensive, proactive force designed 
to disrupt the enemy’s decision, planning, and execution cycles.   
The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004 (NMS) 
is the roadmap to guide the military’s transformation from today’s threat-based 
paradigm toward a future capabilities-based joint force structure prepared to 
engage and defeat new adversaries employing a variety of capabilities anywhere 
in the world.  “Transformation is a process of change devoted to maintaining US 
military superiority in all areas of joint warfighting.  It is an on-going process and 
must be continuous since our enemies will persist in attempts to neutralize or 
erode our superiority and exploit perceived weaknesses.”39  The ability to 
dominate across the battlespace requires not only modernization of existing 
weapons systems and technology but fundamental changes within the cultural 
mindset through an evolution of Service doctrine, training, and education.  While 
adept at countering conventional state militaries that abide by LOAC standards, 
America fails to properly understand the nature of the asymmetric threat and the 
adversary’s ability to manipulate the operational environment.  Identification and 
                                            
38 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 
470-471. 
39 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Global War on Terrorism,” 6-7.  Available [online]: 
http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/chairman/Posture_Statement.html [10 August 2004].  
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comprehension of the enemy and the environment is vital in adjusting to both the 
unpredictable combat conditions encountered throughout the battlespace and the 
atypical treatment received while held in a wide range of captivity situations. 
This is not the first time America recognized the need to transform its 
capabilities to counter an emerging threat.  The fear of communism during the 
1950s, particularly after the Korean Conflict, sparked a flurry of scholastic debate 
and subsequent flood of patriotic literature designed to reinforce American values 
and resolve in the event of combat against and potential capture by a Communist 
aggressor.  “America must view the Communist treatment of captives as but 
another weapon in the world-wide war for the minds of men.  The nation must 
recognize the duplicity of an enemy which pays no more than lip service to the 
Geneva Conventions.”40  The late 1950s discussions of how to prepare military 
members to face the challenges of the communist adversary in conventional 
large-scale warfare mirror the debates that rage in the halls of the Pentagon and 
Capital Hill today regarding conflict in support of the WOT against an elusive 
asymmetric enemy.  Commanders at all levels of the WOT battlespace have the 
immense task of developing a full dimensional protection program that affords an 
appropriate level of security for personnel and materiel without impeding the 
ability to execute mission objectives or exceeding the acceptable level of risk. 
As the U.S. develops a layered defense-in-depth approach to achieve the 
domestic and international goals stipulated within The National Security Strategy 
of the United States of America (NSS), military leaders must consider the 
increased exposure to threats that American forces face in an expeditionary 
environment and the unique requirements of the survival and captivity situations.  
“The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols 
of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends.”41  Due to the transnational nature 
of the evolving threat, military and civilian personnel of the DoD must learn to 
                                            
40 Report by the Secretary of Defense’s Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, 
POW…The Fight Continues After the Battle (August 1955), 31.   
41 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2004, 29.  Available 
[online]: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/html [12 August 2004] [hereafter referred to as NSS, 
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effectively operate in combat and captivity situations with members of United 
States Government (USG) organizations and multinational partners.  The 
dynamics of the expanded joint and combined relationship is further complicated 
by a security environment that spans from conventional to asymmetric threats 
across a battlespace that includes land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.  An 
expanded security environment exposes American and allied personnel to a 
wider spectrum of captivity situations.  The high political, economic, and military 
cost of captivity necessitates the increased investment in pre-captivity, captivity, 
and repatriation preparation provided by CoC training. 
B. FORCE COMPOSITION 
Despite the vast amount of money and resources dedicated to weapons 
development, the single most important and vulnerable asset in the military 
arsenal is the personnel: 
Success in all missions depends on our number one asset - our 
people.  We must continue to keep faith with both our active and 
reserve component members, as well as our retirees.  We also 
need to ensure they have the tools and facilities they need to 
accomplish their missions.42   
Within the NMS construct, the expanded pool of human resources 
engaged in domestic and international operations designed to reinforce the 
overall security of the American homeland is referred to as the “Joint Force,” 
which includes Active Duty, Reserve, and civilians working in coordination with 
interagency and multinational partners.  “The ever-changing dynamics of global 
events will drive the need to integrate DoD and interagency capabilities and, in 
most cases, those of our multinational partners.  Fully integrated operations 
employ only the right forces and capabilities necessary to achieve an objective in 
the most efficient manner.”43  One must examine the implications of mixing the 
military’s Joint Force assets with United States Government (USG) organizations 
and multinational partner in a variety of security environments and an increasing 
spectrum of captivity situations.   
                                            
42 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Global War,” 10. 
43 United States Air Force Posture Statement 2004, 38.  Author received emailed copy of 
document from member of United States Air Force Air Staff. 
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1. America’s Joint Force 
The diversity of America’s Joint Force provides many unique challenges to 
the planning and successful execution of distributed operations.  With an all-
volunteer force, the DoD must harness the talents of individuals from vastly 
diverse ethnic, social, educational, and generational backgrounds with a variety 
of motivations for joining the Armed Forces or seeking civilian and contractor 
positions.  With the expanded role of homeland security and increased 
commitments worldwide in support of the WOT, Active Duty forces can expect 
greater augmentation from Reserve personnel, including Individual Ready 
Reserves who do not perform regularly scheduled training but are called up 
during emergencies.  The Joint Force must be prepared to implement the “1-4-2-
1” construct: 
The force must be sized to defend the US homeland while 
continuing to operate in and from four forward regions to deter 
aggression and coercion and set conditions for future operations.  
Even when committed to a limited number of lesser contingencies, 
the Armed Forces must retain the capability to swiftly defeat 
adversaries in two overlapping military campaigns.  Additionally, 
when the President calls for an enduring result in one of the two, 
the force must have the capability and capacity to win decisively.44   
The extensive outsourcing and privatization efforts during the 1990s 
significantly increased the number of DoD civilian employees and contractors 
that directly accompany military personnel during deployments and contingency 
operations.  DoD civilian employees constitute any “U.S. citizen or foreign 
nationals employed by the Department of Defense and paid from appropriate or 
non-appropriated funds under permanent or temporary arrangement.  That 
includes employees filling full-time, part-time, intermittent, or on-call positions.”45  
The DoD maintains contracts domestically and overseas with U.S. citizens, 
foreign nationals, and third country nationals which include “any individual, firm, 
corporation, partnership, association, or other legal non-federal entity…[for] 
                                            
44 NSS, 4. 
45 U.S. Department of Defense Instruction 1300.23, Isolated Personnel Training for DoD 
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services, supplies, or both, including construction.”46  Although the National 
Guard and Coast Guard are not permanent DoD assets, individuals and units 
can augment Active Duty operations under Title X authorization.  The 
transnational nature of the threat extends the area of operation into the territory 
of non-DoD assets. 
2. United States Government and Independent Organizations 
The Joint Force shares the battlespace with civilian members of USG 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary 
organizations (PVOs), and a variety of independent corporations including 
international journalists.  The USGs commonly seen operating during 
contingencies include, but are not limited to, the Departments of State (DoS), 
Treasury, Defense, Commerce, Transportation, Energy, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, 
Defense Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and U.S 
members of the United Nations.  The CIA, in particular, maintains a long and 
distinguished history of working with the DoD during contingency operations. 
The U.S., a key player in the expansion of globalization, routinely sends 
USG personnel around the world to assist in the advancement of the political, 
economic, and social infrastructures of developing countries.  American NGOs 
and PVOs are also frequently deeply entrenched within nations that later require 
DoD attention.  Any American citizen operating outside the borders of the U.S. is 
a potential hostage or detainee.  The Department of State and Chief of Mission 
are responsible for all USG employees, U.S. citizens, and Joint Force assets, 
excluding personnel specifically assigned to a theater Combatant Commander 
(COCOM), that reside overseas.  During peacetime, the host nation government 
is responsible for the physical recovery of any non-COCOM, U.S. person who is 
detained or held hostage.  In the event of a contingency or declared war, the 
Combatant Commander is only responsible for the physical extraction of Joint 
Force, USG, and coalition partners directly engaged in the U.S.-sponsored 
operation. The host nation remains accountable for the recovery of U.S. 
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personnel who reside in theater but are not assigned to participate in the military 
operation, i.e., Joint Force personnel attached to the local American embassy.47  
The Joint Force must be sensitive to the relationships that USGs, NGOs, and 
PVOs establish with the host nation as such contacts may play a critical role in 
the event of a personnel recovery operation.   
3. Multinational Partners 
The increasing succession of assaults by transnational terrorist 
organizations employing asymmetric tactics and techniques is compelling the 
U.S. to reexamine the traditional perceptions of threats and the need for 
worldwide cooperation and assistance.  The unpredictable and violent attacks on 
unsuspecting civilian personnel, facilities, and infrastructure cause severe 
political, economic, and social disruptions that frequently affect the entire 
international community.  Advanced nations can no longer attempt to thwart 
transnational threats without the assistance of other countries.  “Strengthening 
regional alliances and coalitions helps to create favorable regional balances of 
power that help bring pressure to bear on hostile or uncooperative regimes.  
Multinational partnerships expand opportunities for coalition building through 
combined training, experimentation and transformation.”48  Global cooperation is 
necessary to effectively and efficiently combat threats, particularly terrorist 
organizations.  As the battlefield continues to expand into the realm of 
cyberspace, the international community can offensively track, target, and 
eliminate the ability of an adversary to obtain weapons of mass destruction, 
conventional weaponry, narcotics, and other potentially lethal substances.   
The international community must unite in an offensive and defensive 
battle to interrupt the planning cycle and defeat transnational terrorists.  
Offensive use of military assets, particularly intelligence collection platforms, 
against terrorist organizations and sponsors of terrorism may enable 
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counterterrorist organizations to gradually decimate the terrorists’ support 
structure. “In the current operational environment, the US employs its military in 
combined operations with military forces of other nations; whether US acts as 
part of a long-standing alliance commitment or an ad hoc coalition of forces, the 
PR community must be prepared and able to execute its mission in concert with 
other nations’ forces”49   
C. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE BATTLESPACE 
The Joint Force, USG and multinational partners face a wide range of 
threats across a complex battlespace.  Conventional and asymmetric adversaries 
operate on the land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains of the battlespace.  
The fluidity of the operational environment and limited availability of resources 
heighten the need to understand the nature of the enemy.  To achieve full 
spectrum dominance, the American military must analyze the enemy’s 
capabilities.  “A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be 
transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where 
and when a war might occur.”50  The NMS describes the threat in terms of 
traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive capabilities. 
1. Conventional - Traditional 
Traditional threats include large-scale, force-on-force “…states employing 
legacy and advanced military capabilities and recognizable military forces, in 
long-established, well-known forms of military competition and conflict.”51  In this 
case, the opponents generally abide by the laws of war and afford GPW rights 
and protections to captured personnel.  The U.S. maintains a flexible deterrent 
option posture which includes weapons of mass destruction.  With the dissolution 
of the former Soviet Union, very few nations maintain the capability to challenge 
the U.S in the traditional arena.  Due to the nature of the evolving threat, 
American military and civilian leaders must transition from a strictly “full-scale 
war” mindset to unconventional operations against an enemy employing 
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asymmetric tactics.  “Some of these adversaries are politically unconstrained 
and, particularly in the case of non-state actors, may be less susceptible to 
traditional means of deterrence.”52 
2. Asymmetric – Irregular, Catastrophic, Disruptive 
Unlike traditional warfare, asymmetric conflicts utilize a limited expenditure 
of force to achieve a political goal and involve the employment of unconventional 
tactics and techniques.  Irregular threats use “…unconventional methods 
adopted and employed by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state 
opponents.”53   
After the Second World War, the transnational nature of the communist 
threat drove the requirement for a more flexible military capability.  During the 
late 1960s, international terrorism diverted America’s attention from the spread of 
communism.  Terrorist organization, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, 
threatened the safety of Americans abroad and the security of U.S. national 
interests.  The German Red Army Faction (RAF) performed a series of 
bombings, assassinations, kidnappings of prominent political or business 
officials, hostage taking, and hijackings.  Throughout the 1980s, U.S. and other 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member embassies, military facilities, 
and personnel were under constant threat of terrorist attacks.  RAF activities 
were eventually overshadowed by the international activities of Middle Eastern 
terrorist groups.  Fatah, and later the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
transitioned from military operations against the Israeli armed forces to actively 
targeting unarmed, geographically removed noncombatants associated with any 
nation perceived to support the Israelis in the conflict with the Arabs.  The terror 
campaigns of the Irgun Zvai Le’umi (I.Z.L. or Irgun), the Freedom Fighters for 
Israel (Lehi), Fatah, and the PLO utilized tactics including bombings, shootings, 
airline hijackings, and assassinations against American citizens and facilities.   
In the WOT, America potentially faces two old adversaries utilizing new 
methods and technology.  Insurgents and transnational terrorist organizations 
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now aggressively exercise unconventional tactics against both civilian and 
military entities, regardless of the size and strength disparity.  The events in 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM raise the issue of how to distinguish between 
insurgent groups using terrorism as a political tool and transnational terrorist 
organizations.  Initially, one must consider the differences between mass-based 
forms of political violence and terrorism.  Insurgencies, revolts, and revolutions, 
though similar to terrorism in the desire to achieve a political goal, are mass-
based upheavals that target the established political system or governmental 
body within a particular nation.   
Insurgents and revolutionaries may resort to the use of terror in armed 
resistance against governmental officials and facilities, but typically only after 
nonviolent efforts fail to produce the desired changes in the existing political, 
economic, or social system.  The small group militants seek to gain political 
independence, formal recognition of status, or territorial acquisition from the 
larger state entity by attempting to rally the support of the masses within their 
own subculture.  The militants use terrorist tactics to invoke fear and provoke a 
reaction from their own people and the targeted government.  The installation of 
fear within the indigenous population establishes a control mechanism to 
produce compliant cooperation or creates an image of superiority over the state.  
The use of terror against the state exposes weaknesses and usually provokes a 
more violent reaction that is exploited as a justification for escalation of 
aggressive action.  Ultimately, the insurgents attempt to drive a wedge between 
the populace and the state. 
Terrorist group campaigns differ from mass-based upheavals in member 
base and composition, tactics and techniques, target selection, transnational 
capability, and overall campaign strategy.  Terrorism is the methodical 
application or instigation of violence by one group against another, not 
necessarily of the same nationality, to exert influence through intimidation in 
pursuit of self-proclaimed political goals.  “Terrorism is not fundamentally a 
military problem; it is a political, social, and economic problem.  A military, by its 
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nature, is not suitably structured, trained or equipped to defeat terrorism.”54  
Terrorism typically appears when a small group is unable to accomplish a 
particular goal in the preferred manner and timeframe with the desired results.  It 
is not uncommon for a terrorist group to start as a radical offshoot of an 
insurgency movement, as in the case of West Germany’s Red Army Faction and 
Italy’s Red Brigade.  “Individuals or groups use terrorism to gain objectives 
beyond their inherent capabilities.  Employment of terrorist methods affords a 
weak nation an inexpensive form of warfare.”55  The terrorists, who adamantly 
believe the accomplishment of the goal justifies the use of violent tactics, 
recognize that “…serious battle would clearly be suicidal, hence the recourse to 
stealth, surprise, suddenness, and the selection of targets for their symbolic 
value.”56  The use of “hit and run” guerilla tactics enables the terrorists to engage 
a superior enemy without involvement in a protracted conflict.  “Violent acts, or 
threats of violence, have been used throughout history to intimidate individuals 
and governments into meeting terrorist demands.  Terror is inexpensive, low-risk, 
highly effective, and allows the weak to challenge the strong.”57  Many groups, 
particularly in the Middle East, use religion to justify the initiation of an attack 
against individuals from different faiths.   
The terrorist factions claim to represent the needs and desires of the 
masses to add legitimacy to the use of terror.  The perception of legitimacy is 
shaped by the culture, history, and ideology of both the aggressor and the victim, 
hence the expression “one man’s terrorist is another man’s patriot.”  In some 
cases, terrorism is used as an avenue to extract vengeance and is unrelated to 
the pursuit of a legitimate political or social goal.  Government use of terror and 
terrorism demonstrates a desire to assert dominance, regain control of a situation 
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to prevent the loss of legitimacy or authority, or an inability or unwillingness to 
recognize the needs or desires of the constituents.   
Although the occurrences of terrorism throughout history share similar 
characteristics, each case is shaped by the existing societal conditions and 
available technology.  Traditional groups, referred to as revolutionary, modern 
revolutionary, and non-revolutionary modern terrorists, utilize conventional 
methods to generate terror.  The new breed of terrorists employs terrorism in the 
name of religious ideology and ethnic or racial hatred.  Islamic fundamentalists, 
millenarians, messianics, apocalyptic sects and cults, and Christian right wing 
groups use conventional methods and weapons of mass destruction.  As 
conventional weapons become more monotonous and attract less international 
attention, radical groups will employ more extreme methods to further their 
causes.  Unlike the traditional groups, the new generation groups are not bound 
by the same moral reservations and are not concerned with losing popular 
support.  The apocalyptic religious groups, in particular, view biological and 
chemical weapons as a pestilence to bring about the end of the world and 
employ transnational asymmetric tactics, including suicide attacks, in pursuit of 
martyrdom, ethnic cleansing, or to seek revenge for perceived injustices.   
The repetitive employment of conventional weapons by terrorist 
organizations around the world, however, has desensitized the mass populace to 
traditional violence.  Terrorists must employ increasingly violent tactics against 
varied targets to generate terror and maintain the interest of the international 
media toward their cause.  Additionally, the use of conventional weapons 
exposures the terrorist to potential harm and increases the possibility of detection 
by a counterterrorist organization.  Catastrophic challenges include 
“…surreptitious acquisition, possession, and possible terrorist or rogue 
employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects.58  Weapons of 
mass destruction or effect (WMD/E), which include chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, enhanced high explosive devices as well as other more 
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asymmetric weapons, will continue to increase in lethality, enabling extremist 
groups to cause catastrophic infrastructure devastation.59  WMD/E weapons 
enable the terrorist to deliver agents or materials without detection.  The rapid 
worldwide expansion of terrorism, and persistent threat of WMD/E weapons 
deployment, accelerates the need for the international civilian and military 
community to learn how to effectively combat terrorists throughout the 
battlespace.  WMD/E weapons produce both physical and psychological 
devastation to a nation’s infrastructure and impacts the international community.  
The actual or threatened use of WMD/E weaponry creates panic that can disrupt 
the political, social, and economic operations of a nation.  The proliferation and 
ease of acquisition of WMD/E weapons continually elevates the concern within 
the international community of mass casualties and infrastructure devastation.   
Transnational terrorist organizations and radical groups or individuals 
often lack access to money, materials, or knowledge needed to support 
employment of WMD/E technology and require the support of a state sponsor to 
effectively employ a strategy of unconventional warfare.  Most state sponsors 
conduct support activities clandestinely to avoid retaliation from other 
international entities or prevent damage to developing political relations with 
Western nations.  The sponsor can use the extremist group to accomplish a 
hidden political agenda against an adversary without jeopardizing its position in 
the international community.  As part of the WOT, the U.S. vowed to pursue any 
country or entity that supports terrorist groups or activities.  “We make no 
distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to 
them.”60 
With the assistance of state sponsors and the Internet, terrorists can 
acquire all of the components to produce WMD/E devices.  The accessibility and 
privacy afforded by the Internet enables state sponsors to provide all of the 
components and knowledge required to assemble a weapon of mass destruction.  
Chemical, biological, and high yield explosive weapons are now easier to 
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produce outside of laboratory environments, enabling extremists to assemble 
weapons within private residences.  Poorly regulated control over existing 
biological and chemical weapons programs enabled groups like the Aum 
Shinrikyo and al Qaeda to attempt acquisition of chemical and biological agents.  
Since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, radiological and nuclear 
materials are easier to obtain due to poor regulation of nuclear materials, lack of 
security at nuclear storage facilities, and an active Russian black market.  
Despite the increased likelihood that a radical terrorist group could obtain the 
materials for a nuclear or radiological device, the specialized knowledge and 
restrictive handling procedures decreases the possibility of successful 
deployment of such devices.  The materials, technology, personnel, information, 
and money provided by state sponsors shape the tactics and techniques used by 
the extremists. 
In addition to catastrophic challenges, the U.S. must address non-WMD/E 
threats to the political, economic, and military infrastructure.  Disruptive threats 
are “…those likely to emanate from competitors developing, possessing, and 
employing breakthrough technological capabilities intended to supplant an 
opponent’s advantages in particular operational domains.”61  Despite a 
significant military advantage throughout the globe, the U.S. is vulnerable to 
economic exploitation by states, independent organizations, or individuals with 
superior technological capabilities.  Research and development in any field that 
provides another country an advantage over America is considered a disruptive 
threat, i.e., information technology, medicine, energy resources, communications 
food production, etc.   
The unrestricted access to advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
equipment also possesses a challenge to military and law enforcement officials.  
The availability of advanced technology, provided by a state sponsor or produced 
internally, influences the ability of terrorist organizations to exist and operate 
despite the aggressive surveillance and reconnaissance efforts of international 
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counterterrorist (CT) organizations.  Advanced weapons, secure 
communications, computers, security devices, and intelligence-gathering 
equipment are essential to thwart the efforts of CT organizations.  The 
development and operational capabilities of terrorist groups suffer within 
societies that employ advanced technology against terrorism.   
With the expanding spectrum of threats, from traditional state-on-state to 
irregular non-state actors, the U.S. and its allies must face the possibility of 
capture in a wide range of environments.  The varied capabilities of traditional, 
irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats present a constant threat in 
peacetime and during contingency operations. 
D. SPECTRUM OF CAPTIVITY 
As the Joint Force transforms its mindset and training away from specific 
adversaries and conflict locations to capabilities tailored toward how an 
adversary fights, one must also consider the ability of an adversary to exploit 
captives within the new security environment and battlespace.  Captors operate 
within political, social, and economic environments that place limitations on 
behavior and actions.  The spectrum of capture situations fall within one of three 
environments: constrained, blended/adaptive, and unconstrained. 
1. Constrained Environment 
Within a constrained environment, the captor is part of an internationally 
recognized governmental entity that is influenced by both the legal accountability 
and reciprocity rules imbedded within international law and the potential impact 
on political and economic standing as determined by world opinion.62  The 
detainee generally does not have great influence over the release process, which 
usually requires official diplomatic intervention.  In the performance of official 
peacetime duties, DoD personnel may purposefully or inadvertently violate the 
sovereignty of another country.63  In July 1995, China detained Colonel Joseph 
Chan and Captain Dwayne Florenzie, attaches assigned to the U.S. Consulate 
General’s office in Hong Kong, for allegedly sneaking into a restricted area                                             
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located within the vicinity of Beijing and photographing the activities of a sensitive 
military exercise.  International media coverage and extensive diplomatic efforts 
convinced the Chinese government to release both officers after a brief 
detention.   
Similarly, China detained the twenty-four multi-Service crew members of 
an American Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft that collided with a Chinese F-8 
fighter and eventually landed on Chinese soil in April 2001.  China released the 
crew after twelve days of intensive diplomatic negotiations and international 
scrutiny.  In both detention situations, China openly acknowledged the detention 
of DoD personnel and conducted formal negotiations with American political 
officials to secure the release.  Although subjected to interrogations and varying 
degrees of mental and physical distress, all of the detainees returned to U.S. 
control relatively unharmed.64 
Occasionally, a hostile government will detain personnel without formal 
notification to the captive’s government.  In June 2003, Iran detained four West 
Virginia National Guard soldiers, one U.S. Army contractor, and several foreign 
nationals traveling in a boat on the Shatt Al Arab River in support of Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM.  Unbeknownst to the U.S. government, Iran interrogated and 
released the crew after twenty-nine hours of detention.65  The potential political, 
economic and almost certain military fallout of detaining American citizens may 
have motivated Iran to avoid official notification and quickly release the captives. 
The most commonly known captivity situation within a constrained 
environment is the capture of DoD personnel during wartime.  The captive is 
classified as a POW and afforded the rights and protections stipulated within the 
Geneva Conventions.  POWs do not directly facilitate the release process and 
are legally held until the cessation of formal hostilities.  Extensive literature is 
available detailing the experiences of POWs in the Korean Conflict, Vietnam 
War, and Operation DESERT STORM. 
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2. Blended/Adaptive Environment 
Captors within blended/adaptive environments include irregular non-state 
actors and quasi-governmental entities that, while somewhat concerned with 
international acceptance, have some form of political agenda or objective and are 
influenced by the opinion or acceptance of local constituents.66  The captive is 
considered a detainee or hostage and rarely exerts any influence over the 
release process.  The captor, in directly violation of international law, uses the 
isolated person to gain attention from a particular audience and will demonstrate 
some degree of restraint in the use of violence. 67  In blended/adaptive 
environments, the captive may fall under the control of several different quasi-
state and non-state actors within a short period of time and subsequently 
transition between hostage, detainee, and POW status.  The captive may lack 
the situational knowledge, e.g., identification of the captor and corresponding 
legal status, needed to correctly select the appropriate guidance as provided in 
DoDI 1300.21. 
In conflicts between members of the same nation, the indigenous actors 
do not have state status and are not normally bound to the restrictions of 
international law.  Yugoslavia is an unusual case of indigenous conflict in which 
the U.S. participated as a third party under the auspices of the United Nations 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  In 1999, Federal Yugoslavian Forces 
captured three U.S. Army soldiers that strayed into Macedonian territory.  
Although all three soldiers served under Expert on Mission status, the U.S. 
classified the troops initially as detainees and later declared that the troops 
warranted POW classification.  After thirty-two days of captivity, American 
Reverend Jesse Jackson negotiated the formal release with Serb officials.68 
Despite the expanded criteria for combatants under Protocol I, most 
factional quasi-governments and ordered revolutionary forces that possibly 
qualify as a combatant typically fail to abide by the laws of war and are therefore 
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considered unlawful combatants.  Although not recognized by the international 
community, the Taliban served as the de facto ruling entity of Afghanistan.  
Similarly, General Mohammed Farah Aidid hoped to secure formal recognition as 
the leader over Somalia’s collection of warring tribal factions in the early 1990s.  
The well-documented 1993 shootdown of Blackhawk helicopter pilot U.S. Army 
Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Durant provided Aidid with an opportunity to gain 
recognition from the U.S.  Initially, local Aidid sympathizers held Durant hostage, 
in the hopes of collecting a ransom, before turning him over for detention under 
the local militia.  Durant eventually came into the custody of Aidid who, in the 
hopes of attaining political recognition from U.S., conferred POW status, rights, 
and privileges on the injured pilot.  In the span of a few hours, Durant 
unknowingly transitioned from hostage to detainee to pseudo-POW. 
The take over of the American Embassy in Teheran, Iran is another 
example of a captivity situation in which the isolated personnel transitioned from 
hostage to detainee status.  In November of 1979, 450 Iranian students 
conducted a sit-in protest at the American Embassy, purportedly at the urging of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, because the exiled Shah received medical treatment in a 
U.S. hospital.  The nonviolent sit-in turned into a siege and hostage situation 
involving 66 military and civilian American personnel.69  The involvement of the 
Ayatollah makes the captivity situation a possible governmental detention.  After 
intensive political negotiations, and a failed attempt at a military rescue, the 
hostages returned home following 444 harrowing days.70 
3. Unconstrained Environment 
Non-state, irregular actors operating in an unconstrained environment 
pursue self-proclaimed, politically-motivated goals and demonstrate the least 
predictable captor behavior.  International condemnation does not dissuade 
terrorist groups which, in most cases, thrive on the media attention.  The hostage 
plays a great role in determining treatment and prolonged survival, as 
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demonstrated in the 1981 kidnapping of U.S. Army Brigadier General James 
Dozier by the Italian Red Brigade.  Brigadier General Dozier used interpersonal 
skills to establish a relationship with some of his captors.  Italian antiterrorist 
forces rescued General Dozier after 42 days of captivity.  SW-2 Robert Dean 
Stethem, a U.S. Navy diver, did not have the opportunity to establish a 
relationship with the terrorists that hijacked TWA Flight 847 in June of 1985.  
Shiite extremists, upon discovering Stethem’s DoD affiliation, tortured and killed 
the diver to compel the international community to concede to a variety of 
demands.71  As of this writing, the U.S. is working with the Colombian 
government to secure the release of three DoD contractors kidnapped by the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in February 2003.72   
E. COST OF CAPTIVITY 
Unlike the loss of a piece of military hardware, the capture of one Joint 
Force, USG, or multinational asset carries a high political, economic, and military 
cost.   
1. Political 
As witnessed with the detainment of U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, the 
capture of one U.S. person can impact national policy, will, and morale.  Captives 
are political bargaining chips that can influence governmental decisions.  In 
constrained environments, diplomatic efforts to secure the release of captive 
often involve official apologies for real or fabricated infractions.  Skillful enemy 
interrogators can extort confessions to crimes never committed and induce the 
isolated person to give information for propaganda purposes.  Photographs and 
televised news broadcasts around the world of “brainwashed” American POWs in 
Vietnam, the beaten faces of pilots in Operation DESERT STORM, or the dead 
body of an Army Ranger dragged behind a truck through the streets of 
Mogadishu enraged the American people and influenced the actions of political 
leaders.  Political analysts speculate that the Iran hostage crisis significantly 
contributed to President Jimmy Carter’s failed reelection bid.   
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Terrorist groups, in particular, demonstrate exceptional skill in 
manipulating the international media.  “The terrorists’ primary intent is to cause 
fear in America’s civilian population, in order to coerce a change in U.S. policy… 
The terrorists will use repeated terrorist acts and an amplification through 
‘friendly media sources’ and engage in the use of propaganda in an attempt to 
intimidate the American population.”73  As the Joint Force increasingly deploys 
forward to conduct operations in blended/adaptive and unconstrained 
environments, with embedded or independent journalists providing live coverage, 
the U.S. government should carefully consider the political consequences 
incurred with the capture of minimally training Joint Force asset versus the 
monetary expense required to improve and expand CoC training.  
2. Economic 
Human asset are unquestionably the most expensive item in the DoD 
budget.  The cost associated with recruiting, training, equipping, sustaining, and 
retaining every military and civilian member of the Joint Force is astronomical.  
The overall value of each person in terms of experience, knowledge, and talent, 
while incalculable, is equally impressive.  The DoD expends a vast amount of 
time, money, and equipment resources to prepare all deployed forces for 
operations within a chemical or biological environment because the possibility 
exists that the enemy may possess WMD/E.  The same thought process applies 
to CoC training: 
Because SERE training, unlike pilot training and the like, does not 
have an immediate application, the question of its utility is always 
present until military personnel are called upon to survive in a 
hostile environment or endure captivity.  The corollary questions of 
“cost effectiveness” or “cost benefit” have also arisen as critics of 
SERE training point to the low percentage of trainees who actually 
have to apply their knowledge.74 
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Unlike chemical and biological warfare preparation, CoC training is 
applicable during peacetime and contingency operations, in-garrison or 
deployed, and at any location around the world.  Level B and C CoC training 
provides a mechanism to indoctrinate DoD assets with the basic beliefs and 
moral principles that serve as the foundation of American society; reinforces the 
importance of faith, discipline, teamwork, and support for the chain of command; 
and instills the knowledge and confidence to survive in a variety of capture and 
non-capture situations. 
If we take the narrow position that SERE training exists solely to 
prepare our servicemen for a contingency we hope will occur, we 
might conclude that the cost is high and the benefit is low.  On the 
other hand, if we evaluate the number of successful recoveries 
from operational accidents or combat incidents which are 
attributable to SERE training, the cost seems somewhat more 
acceptable - at least when one considers the offsetting cost of 
training a replacement aircrewman with comparable experience.  
But what value do we place on propaganda thwarted, military 
secrets not lost, or national “image” preserved?  Similarly, what 
value do we place upon servicemen gaining self-assurance, 
maturity, interpersonal relations skills, motivation, patriotism, ability 
to cope with stress, tolerance for frustration, and endurance?75 
The benefits of CoC training applicable to all levels of the battlespace 
certainly warrant consideration for a higher allocation of money and training 
resources. 
3. Military 
In addition to the political consequences, captured personnel can 
adversely affect combat effectiveness and potentially compromise sensitive 
operations and information.  During peacetime and international conflict, Joint 
Force personnel inherently assume the risk of becoming prospective sources of 
information for the enemy.  Captors obtain information through the process of 
interrogation.  For centuries, mankind extracted information human sources for 
use in the production of intelligence.  Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT) is 
the oldest and most widely practiced method of information collection conducted 
worldwide.  Interrogation of prisoners and detainees by HUMINT personnel, 
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arguably one of the oldest forms of intelligence collection, provides valuable 
military, political, economic, and scientific and technical information that 
facilitates effective battlespace management in a conflict.  “HUMINT can provide 
information on almost any topic of intelligence interest, including order of battle 
(OB) factors as well as scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence subjects.”76  
Despite significant technological advances in imagery and signals intelligence 
(IMINT and SIGINT) capabilities, HUMINT remains the only collection platform 
that can provide insight into enemy intentions and motivations.   
Exploitation of a captive can satisfy gaps in intelligence collection and 
analysis that IMINT, SIGINT, and measurement and signatures intelligence 
(MASINT) are frequently unable to fulfill due to platform limitations.  “HUMINT…is 
necessary…because cameras cannot read minds, guess intentions, or even see 
through the roofs of buildings…”77  A human “sensor” can gain access to 
facilities, materiel, personnel, and other valuable civilian and military assets.  
Additionally, captured personnel may provide equipment and documents 
including “planning documents, technical manuals, contingency plans, and 
weapons systems blueprints.”78   
Interrogators must employ a variety of psychological and physical 
techniques to extract information from their often-unwilling subjects.  
Psychological manipulation proved far more effective in obtaining accurate 
information than physical torture: 
Use of torture…is a poor technique that yields unreliable results, 
may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the 
source to say what he thinks the interrogator want to hear… 
Limitations on the use of methods identified as…prohibited should 
not be confused with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other 
nonviolent or noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in the 
successful interrogation of hesitant or uncooperative sources.79   
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Though every country to varying degrees employs physical manipulation, only 
nations with unsophisticated interrogation programs resort to strictly physical 
torture to elicit information during an interrogation session.  To obtain reliable 
information in an expeditious manner, the interrogator generally employs a 
combination of psychological and physical manipulation.   
CoC training is currently the only vehicle through which DoD personnel 
learn how to reduce the likelihood of capture and decrease the effectiveness of 
enemy exploitation.  Additionally, Joint Force gain the physical and psychological 
tools needed to not only deal with captivity but assist in the reintegration process 
after repatriation. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The NSS and NMS mandate for an increased U.S. presence in forward 
locations inherently exposes more personnel to the risk of capture and 
exploitation.  The political, economic, and military costs of captivity justify the 
need for a greater emphasis on CoC training.  As America’s Joint Force prepares 
for dispersed conventional and asymmetric operations with USG and 
multinational partners in constrained, blended/adaptive, and unconventional 
environments, the DoD must transform existing training programs to prepare 
personnel for a variety of captivity situations.   
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IV. PREPARING THE FORCE FOR FUTURE JOINT 
OPERATIONS: THE WAY AHEAD 
A. OVERVIEW 
As the Joint Force prepares to face a myriad of captivity situations across 
all levels of the battlespace, the U.S. must consider methods to enhance the 
survivability of all personnel in the event of capture.  The fluidity of the security 
environment necessitates the creation and installation of a mental “captivity 
survival tool bag,” or set of skills that enable the captive to survive and return with 
honor regardless of the captor or location of captivity.80  Initially, one must 
examine the moral and psychological foundations needed to increase the 
effectiveness of future CoC training.  As the enemy evolves, the U.S. must 
gradually transform the current CoC training curriculum to prepare DoD assets 
for both conventional and asymmetric threats.  With a more receptive framework 
in place, the core captivity skills will aid the individual in dealing with the rigors of 
captivity alone or with interagency and multinational partners. 
B. MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
One of the most important items in the captivity survival tool bag is a 
resilient moral and psychological foundation that enables the individual to 
effectively rebound from intense mental and physical adversity.  The Joint Force 
team is comprised of individuals from very diverse backgrounds that can affect 
the ability to cope with stressful situations.  While military personnel receive 
varying levels of indoctrination during enlisted basic and officer pre-
commissioning training, the DoD does not provide such instruction to civilian and 
contracted members.  Faith in one’s self, family, Service, country, and God is 
inculcated from the time one enters the U.S. Armed Forces and continues 
throughout the duration of one’s career.  CoC training is rendered relatively 
useless if the individual lacks the faith, determination, hope, and conviction of 
purpose necessary to utilize the acquired skill sets.  “Two of the gravest dangers 
to survival are the desire for comfort and a passive outlook.  You must recognize 
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that these dangers represent attitudes - attitudes that follow lines of least 
resistance, that overrule your effort or desire to cope with stress, that make your 
primary concern the immediate situation rather than the overall problem of 
survival.”81   
The rapid and often uncontrollable transition from combatant to POW, 
detainee, or hostage is a mental and physical challenge unlike any experience in 
an individual’s career:   
The experience of a captive or hostage starts with a trauma and 
becomes a chronic state of stress of a complex, multifaceted 
nature.  At the moment of capture, the POW loses his former status 
and identity.  He faces a new reality where nothing is known and 
his life is in constant danger.82   
The captive must deal with physical injuries, mistreatment which may involve 
torture, and deprivation of basic necessities including sleep, food, and proper 
hygiene items.  The individual experiences a wide range of emotions including 
fear, humiliation, helplessness, anger, loneliness, and guilt throughout the 
captivity process.  Additionally, with the inclusion of interagency and multinational 
partners, the Joint Force member must deal with interpersonal friction and 
cohabitation if captured with others.83 
Dr Edna J. Hunter, a psychologist with several published works on the 
subject of POWs, makes the following observations: 
1.  All individuals can cope with much more stress than they believe 
they could. 
2.  All human beings can be made to behave in ways they did not 
think possible. 
3.  Older and more mature individuals with firmly ingrained values 
and in internal locus of control cope better with capture. 
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4.  Commitment to a cause, such as family, country, or God, helps 
one to endure traumatic conditions. 
5.  Group support, especially from those with similar experiences, 
during the stress or after liberation is of utmost importance to 
POWs and their families. 
6.  Good communication with loved ones during and after captivity 
is key to adjustment. 
7.  Flexible homecoming plans and counseling are important to 
returning captives. 
8.  Preparation for capture, in forms of information and code of 
behavior, may help in coping.84 
The last item, reference to a code of behavior, supports the assertion by many 
former POWs that the CoC served as an emotional anchor from capture through 
repatriation.  The CoC is an invaluable moral guide designed to help individual’s 
psychologically cope with stress regardless of the captivity environment: 
One of the important functions of the code is to help captives 
preserve their belief structures regardless of the mental and 
physical pressures placed on them.  The code offers in succinct 
language an indelible standard of right and wrong based on the 
very values the captive has sworn to uphold.  Moral responsibility 
does not turn on a single event or an outwardly forced act.  It is a 
state of mind not always revealed by the captive's actions.  The 
code seeks to preserve and strengthen free will, not constrain or 
weaken it.”85 
While the words that compose the CoC are fairly simplistic, the intent behind and 
expected standard of behavior contained within each article can elude the casual 
reader without the proper interpretative materials and instructional training. 
C. CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINING 
As per the dictates of E.O. 10631, all military members receive CoC 
training upon entry into the Armed Forces and are expected to uphold the 
standards contained within each article.   
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1. Current Level A, B, and C 
DoDI 1300.21, as discussed in Chapter Two, contains the basic guidance 
for the Services to establish Level A, B, and C Code of Conduct Training 
programs: 
Level A: Minimum level of understanding for all members of the 
Armed Forces, to be imparted during entry training of all personnel. 
Level B: Minimum level of understanding for Military Service 
members whose military jobs, specialties, or assignments entail 
moderate risk of capture and exploitation.  As a minimum, the 
following categories of personnel shall receive Level B training at 
least once in their career: members of ground combat units, 
security forces for high threat targets, and anyone in the immediate 
vicinity of the Forward Edge of Battle Area of the Forward Line of 
Troops.  Training shall be conducted for such Service members as 
soon as they assume a duty that makes them eligible. 
Level C: Minimum level of understanding for Military Service 
members whose military jobs, specialties, or assignments entail a 
significant or high risk of capture and exploitation.  This group of 
personnel should not be limited to those whose position, rank, 
seniority, or exposure to Top Secret or higher classified information 
makes them vulnerable to greater-than-average exploitation efforts 
by a captor.  As a minimum the following categories of personnel 
shall receive formal Level C training at least once in their careers: 
combat aircrews, special operations forces (e.g., Navy special 
warfare combat swimmers and Special Boat Units, Army Special 
Forces and Rangers, Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance units, 
Air Force Special Tactics teams, and psychological operations 
units) and military attaches.  Training shall be conducted for such 
Service members as soon as they assume a duty that makes them 
eligible.86 
Level A generally consists of a thirty minute to one hour briefing, given in 
conjunction with LOAC, in which the six articles are briefly reviewed and 
discussed in a wartime context.  Although many of the young recruits and cadets 
may memorize the words, the significance and history behind the CoC is learned, 
if ever, later in one’s career.  Although DoDI 1300.21 requires periodic refresher 
training, very few military members can recite all six articles verbatim and discuss 
the significance of each article.  Although the spirit of the CoC is applicable 
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throughout the spectrum of captivity, Level A training does not distinguish 
between constrained, unconstrained, and blended environments.  During times of 
extreme emotional stress, inexperienced personnel may inappropriately apply the 
guidance contained within the CoC to the different capture situations, resulting in 
severe physical or mental consequences.  While the CoC contributes to 
strengthening an individual’s moral and psychological foundation, current Level A 
training provides an insufficient breadth and depth of knowledge that may prove 
disastrous in the fluid NMS security environment. 
Level B, created after 1991, consists of two separate training courses to 
address wartime and peacetime requirements.  The wartime course consists of 
nine unclassified and one classified JPRA-produced videotapes, with an 
approximate total running time of five hours, that cover the following learning 
objectives: Code of Conduct; legal aspects of evasion, captivity, and escape; 
preparation for combat; psychological factors; survival principles; introduction to 
evasion; environmental considerations during evasion; primitive medical care; 
personnel recovery; captivity; exploitation; resistance; and escape.87  The 
peacetime training contains two subordinate courses that address the challenges 
of peacetime governmental detention (PGD) and hostage situations.   
The peacetime course concentrates on the following issues: legal aspects 
of peacetime governmental detention; U.S. policy governing peacetime 
governmental detention; psychological aspects of detention; exploitation of 
detainees; resisting interrogation in a peacetime governmental detention; 
communication in peacetime governmental detention; the recovery process; 
hostage avoidance; DoD guidance; survival; psychological pressures; 
exploitation; communications; and hostage recovery.88  The PGD course material 
consists of two unclassified and two classified videotapes with a combined 
running time of just over two and one half hours.  The hostage class consists of 
one classified and six unclassified videotapes with a total running time of almost 
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three hours.  DoD members that do not have the appropriate security clearance 
are not required to view the classified videotapes to complete the Level B 
training.   
Level C wartime and peacetime training, conducted only at a Service 
SERE school or JPRA-approved facility, encompasses the Level B training 
material and provides the student with hands-on training over a roughly two week 
period.  The Level C wartime training encompasses all of the Level B wartime 
material with additional information in the following sections: preparation for 
combat, survival principles, personnel recovery, and resistance.  The student 
must also participate in operational training and resistance training laboratory 
exercises.89  The Level C peacetime training includes role-play and resistance 
training laboratory scenarios and classroom instruction on all of the Level B 
peacetime material with additional information in the following sections: legal 
aspects of peacetime governmental detention, and hostage avoidance.90   
2. Relevance: Perceptions of American Military Personnel 
Although the CoC is required training for all military personnel and serves 
as the foundation for all DoD Level A, B, and C SERE programs, one must 
question whether the Code, last revised sixteen years ago, is still relevant in its 
present form to the myriad of threats and captivity environments.91   
Changing world conditions could well require future periodic 
reviews of the Code.  United States and International Law may 
change significantly potential adversaries may introduce radically 
new methods of captor behavior, and new concepts of neutral 
power detention may evolve.  Each of these developments could 
require changes in the Code.92   
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The young officers and enlisted personnel of today will serve in the key 
leadership positions of the DoD envisioned in the NMS construct.  As such, it is 
useful to examine the opinions and perceptions of the individuals who will 
ultimately be responsible for the transformation of Service capabilities from now 
through the next twenty years.  In an effort to obtain a broad perspective of the 
prevailing thoughts on the CoC and its applicability to the asymmetric 
battlespace, 165 officer and enlisted students at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) and the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California 
participated in an anonymous written survey.  Additionally, twenty international 
officers studying at the Naval Postgraduate School, future multinational partners 
of the U.S., provided valuable insights on Conduct After Capture (CAC) training 
which is discussed in Section D of Chapter Four. 
“The Code of Conduct: Is it relevant in today’s asymmetric threat 
environment?” Survey (Appendix A) did not require participants to provide 
specific identifiers to uphold the spirit of academic freedom and encourage the 
respondents to freely express opinions without fear of retribution.  Based solely 
on personal opinions and perceptions, the students provided basic experience 
data, evaluated their comprehension of the CoC based on the existing Service 
training programs, assessed the applicability of the CoC to different capture 
situations, commented on the need for a civilian CoC, and provided additional 
comments and recommendations.  The CoC Survey results contain the opinions 
of a small sample drawn from a very diverse population of military NPS and DLI 
students and does not reflect the official policies or opinions of the individual 
Services as a whole.  The survey also does not account for gender, religious 
preference, or ethnic or cultural backgrounds.  Due to the random selection of 
participants and method of distribution, the respondents did not receive formal 
instruction or guidance.  Thus, the interpretation of each question could vary 
among respondents.  In a few cases, a respondent did not select and answer or 
selected more than one response, as indicated by an (*).  NPS and DLI randomly 
received the survey from the end of April through June 2004, with the ultimate 
goal of obtaining roughly twenty respondents from both the officer and enlisted 
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corps of each Service.  Table 1 provides an abbreviated version of the U.S. 
participant demographics contained in Appendix A. 
 
USAF USA USN USMC
Rank
O1 to O3 6 8 20 12
O4 to O6 15 12 1 9
E1 to E4 3 5 7 19
E5 to E9 18 16 13 1
Yrs in Service
1 to 5 5 6 14 20
6 to 10 11 11 8 11
11 to 15 18 14 8 5
16 to 20 6 5 11 5
20+ 2 5 0 0  
Table 1.   American Military Demographics 
 
Although Executive Order 10631 states that all Service personnel are 
expected to live up to the standards embodied in the CoC, DoD Instruction 
1300.21 only stipulates that “…refresher or continuation training should be 
conducted throughout the Service member’s career.”93  Despite the high 
deployment rate and increased exposure to captivity threats, only 53% of 
respondents indicated that they received some form of yearly refresher training, 
which in reality is a slightly lower percentage as several respondents indicated 
that they had not consistently received yearly training throughout the duration of 
their career (Table 2).  One Army officer commented that, “…The code of 
conduct is relevant, but not well taught.”94 
Perhaps due in part to the sporadic nature of the training, 29% indicated 
that they could not recite a single article of the Code verbatim while 47% could 
recite only one or two articles.  Although unable to recite most of the Code, 39% 
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63 
understood the basic principles and guidelines.  The yearly DoD requirement for 
LOAC refresher training contributed significantly to legal understand of the CoC, 
as 85% of the respondents understood the relationship between the CoC, UCMJ, 



















Total Number Participants 21 21 20 21 21 20 21 20 165
First receive CoC tng
Acdy/ROTC/OTS/OCS/OBC 16 0 16 0 15 0 10 0 57
Basic Tng 5 20 3 21 5 20 9 20 103
First tech tng school 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Other 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 3
Yearly refresher tng
Yes 15 16 10 13 9 7 7 11 88
No 6 5 10 8 12 13 14 9 77
Recite articles verbatim
All 1 1 3 3* 0 0 0 1 9
Most 7 4 2 5 3 0 5 3 29
Some 10 11 11 5 9 12 13 7 78
None 3 5 4 7 9 8 3 9 48
Basic ideas/guidance
All 6 6 8 8 5 1 10 8 52
Most 14 7 6 5 9 8 7 8 64
Some 1 8 4 5 7 9 3 3 40
None 0 0 2 2* 0 2 1 1 8
CoC, the UCMJ, GC
Yes 18 21 17 16 19 17 15 18 141
No 3 0 3 5 2 3 5* 2 23
*Respondant did not answer
 
Table 2.   American Military Code of Conduct Training Statistics 
 
Many of the DoD’s future leaders, ranging from 75% to 81%, believed that 
for the most part the CoC is applicable to peacetime government detentions, 
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political prisoner/hostage situations, and terrorist hostage captivity environments 
(Table 3).  While 94% of respondents asserted that the CoC is still relevant, the 
participant pool was equally divided over the proposal to reword the six articles.  
“Increasing the complexity of the code to account for various detention 
possibilities could undermine its strengths (simplicity and flexibility).  I think that 
emphasis of other detention possibilities during training allows the current code, 
as an expression of ideals, to remain applicable and useful/valuable.”95  
Conversely, one respondent indicated that “…Based on the new, dynamic threats 
faced by all service members today, I feel the CoC should be revised/updated to 
reflect current situations.”96  Many participants suggested minor wording 



















Total Number Participants 21 21 20 21 21 20 21 20 165
Peacetime gov't detention
Yes 16 14 16 19 19 17 18 15* 134
No 5 7 4 2 2 3 3 4 30
Political prisoner/hostage
Yes 15 13 15 19 18 17 18 18 133
No 6 8 5 2 3 3 3 2 32
Terrorist hostage
Yes 14 12 14 18* 16 15 19 16 124
No 7 9 6 2 5 5 2 4 40
*Respondant did not answer
 
Table 3.   Applicability of Code of Conduct to Captivity Spectrum 
 
When asked if the CoC should be a moral guide or a legally binding code, 
83% agreed with the 1976 Defense Review Committee that it should remain a 
moral guide (Table 4).  Due to the increased presence of civilians in the combat 
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zone, 81% of the participants believed that the USG should create a CoC, and 
the associated training, for its civilian employees.  While DoD civilians and 
contractors are protected by the Geneva Conventions and held liable to some of 
the articles of the UCMJ, they are not subject to the standards contained within 
the CoC.  Many military personnel now work directly for a civilian supervisor, or 
have civilian co-workers, who never receive captivity training.  The dynamics and 
potential dangers of military and civilian co-captivity will be further explored in 



















Total Number Participants 21 21 20 21 21 20 21 20 165
Moral guide/legally binding
Moral Guide 21 17 15* 16 17 15 21 15** 137
Code of Law 0 4 4 5 4 5 0 6** 28
CoC for civilians
Yes 12 21 17 19 14 20 14 16 133
No 9 0 3 2 7 0 6* 4 31
Is CoC still relevant
Yes 20 20 19 20 19* 19 19 19 155
No 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 9
Reworded the CoC
Yes 9 14* 15 7* 7 11 5 13 81
No 12 6 5 13 14 9 16 7 82
*Respondant did not answer/**Respondant selected both answers
 
Table 4.   Considerations for the National Military Security Environment 
 
a. Air Force Officer and Enlisted 
Overall, the Air Force respondents demonstrated a working 
knowledge of the CoC and professed the highest attendance at yearly refresher 
training courses.  USAF participants indicated that the CoC should remain a 
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moral guide and, while still relevant to the future security environment, required 
updated wording to address the asymmetric threats.  One officer recommended 
that a new CoC “…should change ‘prisoner of war’ to a more applicable phrase 
like ‘detained by hostile forces,’”97 while one of the enlisted personnel requested 
the removal of all references to “God.”98  The majority also believed that the DoD 
and USG should establish a CoC for civilian and contracted personnel. 
b. Army Officer and Enlisted 
The Army personnel also demonstrated a working knowledge of the 
CoC but did not score as high in attendance at annual refresher training.  One 
officer commented that “the Code is obviously more rigid than ‘survive with 
honor’ mentality taught in SERE C.  Instruction must be similar, otherwise young 
soldiers will give, name, rank, serial – and die of torture.”99  Although relevant in 
the NMS security environment, several soldiers recommended wording changes 
to several of the articles:   
Code I: The phrase ‘our way of life’ should be replaced or simply 
deleted.  America is a mosaic of cultures, so there is no ‘our’ way of 
life.  Code VI: remove phrase ‘I will trust in my God’ – not all 
Americans are theists.  Code VI: define the principles that freed 
America.  We were not all free at the same time.100 
One enlisted expressed “I believe that the underlying principles of 
the CoC can be applied in all the above situations but those who take the words 
literally may find it hard to apply; for today’s environment it might be useful to 
update the wording (which assumes actual combat operations) or to modify 
training to address a wider variety of situations.  Unfortunately, this type of 
annual training tends to be canned or designed to ‘check the block.’”101  
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c. Navy Officer and Enlisted  
The Navy participants demonstrated minimal proficiency in CoC 
training and maintained that lowest attendance at annual refresher training.  
Although several enlisted members supported changing the CoC to a legally 
binding code, the majority of participants preferred to maintain the moral guide 
status.  Overall, the respondents believed that the CoC is still relevant in the 
changing threat environment and favored keeping the CoC articles in the present 
form.  “I do not believe that making these precepts even more codified or specific 
situation oriented would be beneficial.  Any reasonable sailor should be able to 
apply these general codes to any unique situation that arises.”102   
d. Marine Corps Officer and Enlisted 
The Marine Corps students demonstrated a working knowledge of 
the CoC and its basic concepts but indicated a lack of yearly refresher training.  
Overall, the USMC participants favored the status quo, keeping the code as a 
moral guide and maintaining the articles with the present verbiage.  One Marine 
officer did assert, to the contrary, that “POW is a legal term, so the CoC may 
need to be expanded for other categories.”103   
3. Core Captivity Curriculum and Environmental Training 
Although the DoD may need to review and consider revising the wording 
of the articles, the overarching spirit and intent of the CoC remains applicable to 
threats in the NMS security environment.  The current CoC regulatory guidance 
and training methodology, however, is inappropriate for the complexity of the 
battlespace and will not adequately prepare the Joint Force to face future 
conventional and asymmetric challenges.  In a captivity situation, the isolated 
person does not have the time, and frequently lacks the situational knowledge, to 
determine if POW, detainee, or hostage guidance applies.  In many cases, the 
captive may be an individual deemed “low-risk of capture” and therefore did not 
receive Level B or C training.  The captured member must rely on thirty minutes 
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to one hour of Level A training received years prior during basic or pre-
commissioning training that lies in the vast recesses of the brain.   
In a war for the minds of men, the enemy’s methods can be 
successfully combated by military training and civilian education.  In 
battle and in captivity the fighting American is no better than his 
training and education… it must be presented with understanding, 
skill, and devotion sufficient to implant a conviction in the heart, 
conscience, and mind of the serviceman that full and loyal support 
of the code is to the best interests of his country, his comrades, and 
himself.104   
All Joint Force personnel, regardless of rank, position, or duty location, 
need a captivity survival tool kit that contains straightforward guidance and 
training that addresses the elements common to all capture situations.105  
JPRA’s proposed core captivity curriculum training (CCCT) provides a viable 
means to enhance the survivability of an individual throughout the capture, 
transport, detention, and release phases.  All DoD military and civilian personnel 
must complete classroom or computer-based training (CbT) instruction for CCCT 
Level B upon entry into the Armed Forces and receive yearly refresher training.  
The CCCT Level C course, based on the existing SERE school training 
philosophy of academics, stress inoculation, and stress resolution, is conducted 
for a select group at the Service SERE schools or JPRA-approved facilities.106  
CCCT Level C consists of CCCT Level B with additional material and hands-on 
environmental training scenarios. 
The CCCT program contains ten modules that range from strictly 
classroom instruction to academic role-play scenarios.  Initially, students study 
the spectrum of captivity and discuss the principles associated with the captivity 
resistance postures.  Once the student understands the basic elements of 
environment, potential threats, and response, he or she learns and practices how 
to use situational awareness to select the most appropriate SERE response 
based on the nature of the pre-capture or capture situation.  The student then 
                                            
104 Report by the Secretary of Defense, POW…The Fight, 15. 
105 Russell and Russell, 15 December 2003. 
106 Percival, 16 December 2003. 
69 
explores the psychological aspects of captivity, including the origins of stress, 
coping mechanisms, and the ability to recover readily from adversity.  As most 
Joint Force personnel will operate in small groups or in conjunction with USG and 
multinational partners, the students must understand the relationship of 
leadership and followership and the principles of how to organize a group of 
captives to effectively resist captor exploitation.  Subsequently, the students 
ascertain how to use covert communication techniques and understand basic 
facts and principles associated with maintaining health in captivity.  Through 
academic and role-play scenarios, the students enter the world of exploitation, 
including interrogation, and learn how to develop an effective resistance posture.  
Finally, the course concludes with the different captivity resolution methodologies 
and repatriation efforts.107   
The skills acquired during the CCCT program apply to all captivity 
situations regardless of whom the captor is or where the capture occurs.  CCCT 
uses a common sense approach to provide a flexible set of captivity survival 
tools and enhance the survivability of the DoD’s most valuable warfighting asset.   
4. Instructor and Training Resources 
As with all DoD training programs, the finite number of instructors, training 
facilities, and associated instructional materials are always in high demand.  To 
increase the capacity and effectiveness of CCCT Level B programs, JPRA and 
the Services can explore the following options: 
• CbT Capability: As is the current practice for many LOAC and 
antiterrorism/force protection training programs, military and civilian 
personnel could access an interactive, online program through the 
unclassified JPRA website.  A similar program would reside on the 
classified DoD Internet system for the collateral-level materials.  
CD-ROMs provide an alternative for deployed sites that do not 
have ready access to the Internet. 
• CCCT Cadre and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs): Through the 
existing Joint Instructor Training Center (JITC) or MTTs, JPRA 
could create an extensive collection of military and civilian CCCT 
Level B trainers.  Using the “train-the-trainer” system, a multi-
Service group of CCCT instructor candidates undergo both the 
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Level B course and an instructor training course.  Upon completion, 
the individual receives a “special duty identifier” that will enable 
JPRA and the Services to track the graduate for the duration of his 
or her career.  The new instructor will teach a pre-determined 
number of Level B classes in addition to his or her normally 
assigned duties, in-garrison or deployed, and then start training 
new instructors on-site.  All CCCT trainers would periodically return 
to the JPRA JITC for refresher training and to potentially provide 
fresh role players for Level C training courses.  If JITC training 
space is limited, the Level B Instructor course could overcome the 
physical constraints through a satellite-broadcasted program.  
The sensitive nature and unique instructional methodology used in CCCT 
Level C restricts the dissemination capability.  The most effective and efficient 
training solution is to create a Joint CCCT Facility, preferably in conjunction with 
a Personnel Recovery Battlelab.  Intensive inter-Service rivalries, however, 
hampered similar initiatives in the past.  As the Joint Force increases interaction 
and collocation with interagency and multinational partners throughout the 
battlespace, the DoD should consider the creation of a specialized CCCT sub-
course for non-DoD personnel to enhance synergy and communication.   
5. Training Tracking Mechanism 
Due to the vast differences in how the Services track the completion of 
training courses, a centralized database is necessary to ensure accuracy and 
compliance with the yearly requirement.  A CbT system can automatically 
generate and track training completion reports for storage in a centralized JPRA 
database. 
D. INTERAGENCY AND MULTINATIONAL CAPTIVITY TRAINING 
1. Conduct after Capture: Codes and Training 
Currently, very few interagency organizations maintain a conduct after 
capture training program to prepare employees for captivity under an asymmetric 
threat.  The CIA, DEA, and DOS include some elements similar to SERE in their 
respective training programs but lack a comprehensive program that addresses 
the range of threats.  Overall, the USG lacks a cohesive effort and fails to utilize 
the available DoD materials.108 
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Conversely, many of the multinational partners that actively deploy with 
American forces have well-established CAC programs.  The United Kingdom, 
Germany, Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Pakistan, Uzebekistan, the Czech Republic, Poland, Indonesia, and Jordan are 
only a few of the many nations that attempt to prepare for captivity.  The 
underlying philosophy and specific standards of behavior vary from country to 
country but all have the basic goal of helping the individual to survive in captivity 
and return with honor.  A few countries, in the same manner as the U.S., have a 
code of conduct.  “The code of conduct for CF [Canadian Forces] members has 
been developed to conserve our personnel resources, to deny military 
intelligence to the enemy, to ensure interoperability with our allies and to 
continue offensive action against the enemy.”109  Canada’s Code of Conduct 
After Capture (CCAC) consists of a short preamble and five simple rules: 
The Preamble to the CCAC 
- The aim of the CCAC is for you to survive with honour.  
- Do not surrender to the enemy while you still have the means to 
achieve your mission.  
- If captured, remember you are still a member of the CF and 
remain subject to its rules and obligations.  
The CCAC, if captured, remember your PRIDE 
- Principles of leadership,  
- Resist exploitation by all means available,  
- Information to be given,  
- Dignity and self-respect must be maintained, and 
- Escape.110  
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Canada’s CCAC training program is modeled after America’s current Level A, B, 
and C CoC programs.  While the U.S. allows limited, carefully controlled 
application of physical duress in advanced SERE training, countries like Israel 
allow the instructors to harshly punish and humiliate the students.  One of the 
Israeli Air Force officers described his training as “…during the aviation course 
we had to undergo drills preparing us in the event that we would be captured… 
We were blindfolded for three days, humiliated, and not allowed to use the 
toilet.”111   
In an effort to ascertain the opinions of future multinational partner 
regarding the effectiveness of CCAC training, twenty international officers 
attending the Naval Postgraduate School participated in a written survey. 
2. Perceptions of International Military Officers 
“The Conduct After Capture Training: Is it relevant in today’s asymmetric 
threat environment?” Survey (Appendix A) utilized the same construction and 
distribution methodology as the American “Code of Conduct” survey and 
experienced the same problem areas.  Based solely on personal opinions and 
perceptions, students from Greece, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Poland, Bulgaria, 
Turkey, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Jordan provided 
basic experience data, assessed the applicability of their country’s CCAC to 
different capture situations, commented on the need for a civilian CoC, and 
provided additional comments and recommendations.  The overall regional 
distribution included fifteen Europeans, three from the Middle East, and two from 
Asia. 
Due to the random selection of participants and method of distribution, the 
respondents did not receive formal instruction or guidance.  Thus, the 
interpretation of each question could vary among respondents.  The responses 
reflect the opinions of the individual and in no way represent the official policies 
of the participant’s government or Service.  The comments included in this 
section contain the sentence structure, grammar, and spelling errors as provided 
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in the respondent’s survey.  Table 5 provides an abbreviated version of the 




O1 to O3 2 6 2
O4 to O6 3 5 2
Yrs in Service
1 to 5 0 4 1
6 to 10 2 2 0
11 to 15 0 0 1
16 to 20 2 1 0
20+ 1 4 2  
Table 5.   International Student Demographics 
 
The CAC survey confirmed that not all countries with an active military 
force have a CCAC or the associated training program (Table 6).  Only seven of 
the students indicated that they received yearly refresher training.  Of the 
countries that have a viable program, a few do not offer the training to all 
branches of Service.  Several students expressed a desire to attend CAC training 
and regretted that their Service did not have a program.  One of the Pakistani 
respondents indicated that, “I think more hostile/maltreatment preparation is a 
must…”112   
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Europe Asia Middle East
Existing CCAC
Yes 10 1 3
No 2 1 0
Not sure 3 0 0
First receive CoC tng
Commissioning Source 0 1 1
First technical training school 7 0 2
First unit of assignment 1 0 0
Other 2 0 0
Yearly refresher tng
Yes 4 0 3
No 11 2 0  
Table 6.   International Conduct After Capture Training Statistics 
 
Like the American participants, the international students overwhelmingly 
indicated that civilians working in conjunction with military forces should have a 
CCAC (Table 7).  One respondent from the Czech Republic disagreed with the 
issuance of a code but not the implementation of a training program.  “I believe 
civilians should receive some sort of training/instructions, but I do not think they 
necessarily need a code...”113 
 
Europe Asia Middle East
Moral guide or legally binding code
Moral Guide 4 0 0
Code of Law 3 0 3
Both 1 0 0
Not sure 7 2 0
CoC for civilians
Yes 12 2 3
No 2 0 0
Not sure 1 0 0  
Table 7.   Considerations for the National Military Security Environment 
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Overall, the international respondents did not demonstrate a strong 
degree of confidence that their CAC codes or training applied to all of the capture 
situations (Table 8).   
 
Europe Asia Middle East
Hostile peacetime gov't detention
Yes 9 1 2
No 1 1 0
Not sure 5 0 1
Political prisoner/hostage
Yes 7 0 1
No 4 2 2
Not sure 4 0 0
Terrorist hostage
Yes 6 1 2
No 5 1 1
Not sure 4 0 0  
Table 8.   Applicability of Code of Conduct After Capture to Captivity Spectrum 
 
As with their American counterparts, many of the international participants 
acknowledged the need and desire for CAC training in preparation for an 
asymmetric security environment.  A Pakistani officer stated, “I personally feel 
that under the prevailing and perceived envisaged future battle field environment 
and involvement of forces in international/joint operations (UN peace-making and 
keeping, etc.) CAC training is a must and must be initiated right from the outset 
at the basic training institutions.114 
With the ever increasing presence of multinational assets in forward 
deployed operations, the U.S. Joint Force must consider the impact of capture 
situations with international military forces that have limited or philosophically 
different CAC training.  In addition to the inter-Service disparities, American 
military captives will encounter the challenges of establishing a multinational 
chain of command, reconciling different resistance posture thresholds, and 
                                            
114 Survey respondent I-O-18. 
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dealing with the unique aspects of cross cultural communication and 
interpersonal relationships.  The inclusion of interagency civilians further 
complicates and exacerbates the challenges of captivity. 
3. Reconciling the Disparities between American Military and 
Interagency Civilian Personnel 
Civilians provide a level of expertise and continuity that is essential to all 
military operations.  Historically, U.S. civilians supporting DoD personnel in high 
threat areas rarely received the pre-deployment contingency training deemed 
necessary to enhance survival of the military forces.  To reaffirm the DoD’s 
commitment to protecting civilian employees and contractor and enhance 
interoperability with military counterparts, OSD/DPMO produced and published 
DoDI 1300.23 Isolated Personnel Training for DoD Civilians and Contractors: 
Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DoD civilian 
employees, and DoD contractors placed in danger of being 
isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade while 
participating in U.S.-sponsored activities or missions is one of the 
highest priorities of the Department of Defense.  The Department of 
Defense has a moral obligation to protest its personnel, prevent 
exploitation of its personnel by adversaries, and reduce the 
potential for captured personnel being used as leverage against the 
United States.115 
DoDI 1300.23 stipulates that all DoD civilian employees and contractors 
must complete a modified version of CoC Level A, B, or C training prior to 
entering the theater of operations.  Levels A and B include computer-based 
academics that discuss the elements of POW, detainee, and hostage situations.  
Level C is restricted to the Service SERE schools or JPRA-approved facilities.  
Unfortunately, as experienced by the military personnel, only individuals deemed 
medium – to – high risk of capture receive the advanced training.  Additionally, 
the issue of chain of command continues to present problems in military-civilian 
co-capture situations.  Since civilians are not required to abide by the CoC, 
military personnel occasionally experience resistance when attempting to 
establish a command structure.  Overall, DoDI 1300.23 is a positive effort to 
strengthen the cohesiveness and integrity of the Joint Force team.   
                                            
115 DoDI 1300.23, 2. 
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Unfortunately, the U.S. government does not have a similar protective 
system in place for the interagency organizations.  The 1979 hostage crisis in 
Iran reveals the myriad of challenges created when untrained USG civilian 
employees and DoD military personnel attempt to co-exist in a captivity situation.  
Military personnel assigned to a U.S. embassy fall under the command of the 
highest ranking DoS civilian, the Chief of Mission.  During the 1979 crisis, the 
chain of command fell apart as the civilian hostages, comprised primarily of DoS 
and CIA employees, refused to participate in a command structure with the multi-
Service military officer and enlisted personnel.  The DoD members received 
different levels of CoC training and had little knowledge or experience dealing 
with hostage situations.  The civilians, with the possible exception of the CIA 
agent, lacked the resistance and coping mechanisms needed to mentally and 
physically handle the stresses of captivity.  Collectively, the hostages failed to 
form a cohesive team and did not uphold the tenets of the CoC.116 
In the hopes of overcoming the challenges experienced by the U.S. 
Embassy hostage, the USG is drafting a National Security Presidential Directive 
(NSPD) to address the recovery of isolated or missing U.S. government 
personnel overseas: 
United States Government personnel engaged in U.S. 
Government-sponsored activities outside of the United States are 
at risk of isolation or separation from friendly control.  This could 
lead to their possible capture or detention by individuals, groups, or 
governments hostile to our interests that are willing to exploit our 
personnel to further their own causes.  We must assure U.S. 
Government personnel and contractors serving their country 
abroad that if they become isolated, we will not abandon them.  
This promise is a fundamental tenet of our national character and a 
moral imperative.  The U.S. Government must ensure that we 
deliberately plan, train, and equip ourselves in such a way as to set 
the stage for successful personnel recovery operations and 
returning our personnel to safety.  This directive establishes roles 
and responsibilities within the Government for personnel recovery 
efforts.117 
                                            
116 Russell and Russell, 15 December 2003. 
117 Draft NSPD, 1. 
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The draft NSPD is a monumental effort to mandate the creation of recovery 
procedures and captivity training programs for all interagency organizations.  The 
initiative contains a proposed standard of behavior for isolated civilian personnel: 
If despite their best efforts, personnel find themselves in potentially 
isolating situations, they should do everything possible to return 
themselves to friendly control.  By adhering to the following 
guidelines, Americans will protect themselves and others while 
isolated and enhance our efforts to recover them:   
As Americans, they should assist other Americans with whom they 
are isolated to the best of their abilities and do nothing that may 
harm a fellow American.   
U.S. personnel should resist attempts by their captors to exploit 
them to the utmost of their ability, and at all times protect classified 
information.  At no time should they accept special treatment from a 
detaining element, unless such treatment comes with no conditions 
and is given equally to all Americans in the same situation.  They 
should be aware that their captors will attempt to use them to shape 
world opinion and that their actions while in captivity will impact our 
ability to recover them safely.   
Americans should not make written, oral, or videotaped statements 
harmful to the U.S.; however, after carefully assessing their risk, 
Americans should make generic written, oral, or videotaped 
statements that could provide information regarding their status 
(i.e., proof of life).   
Americans isolated from friendly control should carefully plan their 
actions and realize that their decisions can impact the 
Government’s ability to affect their recovery or release 
profoundly.118 
Presidential approval of the draft NSPD is a necessary step toward improving the 
integration and synergy of the Joint Force with interagency and multinational 
partners in the WOT and other global conflicts. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The evolving nature of the threat envisioned within the NMS security 
environment drives the need for a more flexible set of captivity survival skills.  
Although the spirit and intent of the CoC remain valid, the wording of the articles 
                                            
118 Draft NSPD, 3. 
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and the associated training programs must change to reflect the needs of the 
warfighter.  Level A CoC training is ineffective and inadequate due to variations 
in Service training curricula and inconsistent reinforcement.  CoC Levels B and C 
provide three distinctly different sets of guidance for captivity situations that can 
overlap and confuse the isolated person.  The core captivity curriculum training 
program offers a viable option to enhance the survivability of the Joint Force, 
interagency civilians, and multinational partners.  In addition to training initiatives, 
the USG and multinational partners must resolve conduct after capture policy 
and guidance deficiencies to establish a common framework with the Joint Force 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004 
security environment generates the requirement for significant changes to the 
current DoD Level A, B, and C Code of Conduct training programs.  The DoD 
must transform all aspects of the warfighting capability to effectively and 
efficiently counter any challenge across the broad spectrum of enemy 
capabilities.  The existing CoC programs and SERE skill sets lack the flexibility to 
enable the isolated person to rapidly adapt to changes in the future captivity 
environment.  To meet the objectives stipulated in the NMS, in support of the 
National Security Strategy, the DoD must develop a CoC training program that 
compensates for the inability of the international legal structure to protect 
captives in the new security environment. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
To enhance the survivability of DoD personnel in captivity situations, the 
transformation process should consider the existing policy, attitude, and training 
challenges. 
1. Existing International Law, Domestic Directives, and Service 
Regulations Inadequate 
The existing body of International law, domestic directive, and Service-
level regulations are not suited to address the challenges inherent to asymmetric 
operations.  Although still appropriate for conventional POWs, the Geneva 
Conventions and additional Protocols do not sufficiently address the needs of 
detainees and hostages.  Similarly, the UCMJ and CoC use language developed 
for traditional Cold War situations.  The spirit and intent of the CoC remains valid 
but the moral guidance contained within the articles may be misconstrued and 
misapplied in different capture scenarios.  Service CoC regulations and training 
programs, while extremely adept at dealing with captivity in the contemporary 
environment, lack the adaptability needed by the expeditionary Joint Force.  
Additionally, Joint Force member use of the SERE skill set is hampered in DoD-
82 
interagency capture situations due to a lack of regulatory guidance or standards 
of behavior for USG civilians. 
2. National Military Strategy Mindset  
The NMS and NSS inherently require the DoD and USG to develop a new 
perspective on combating adversaries around the world.  America must gain a 
greater understanding of the nature of the threat to cultivate the capabilities need 
to achieve full spectrum dominance.  To attain the necessary level of 
understanding, the DoD and USG must overcome internal and interagency 
cultural differences and parochial attitudes to facilitate communication and 
collaboration.  With the increased presence overseas, permanent or temporary, 
Joint Force personnel can anticipate an increased risk of capture with 
interagency or multinational partners.  The DoD and USG, with the support of the 
Executive Branch, must create an environment conducive to the growth of the 
NMS mindset. 
3. CoC Training Must Transform 
The principles and moral guidance contained within the CoC remains 
relevant in the future security environment.  The current SERE training that 
supports the CoC, however, does not facilitate a smooth transition between 
constrained, blended/adaptive, and unconstrained captivity environments.  Level 
A, the most widely received CoC training, does not provide the depth and 
breadth needed to assist the isolated person in an asymmetric capture situation.  
Levels B and C provide separate guidance for wartime POWs and peacetime 
detainees and hostages.  Isolated persons need one set of flexible, adaptable 
captivity skills that apply to all environments.  Additionally, the established set of 
captivity skills should be available to USG civilians and select multinational 
partners. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The following policy, mindset, training, and supporting recommendation 
are offered to facility transformation and enhance survivability of vulnerable Joint 




• Reevaluate rights, protections, and restrictions of Geneva Conventions 
and Protocols and consider amendments or supplements to clarify 
existing articles 
• Revise articles of UCMJ to reflect dynamics of new security 
environment 
• Conduct review of CoC and consider revision of existing articles 
• Support adoption of Draft National Security Presidential Directive 
“Recovery of Isolated or Missing U.S. Government Personnel Abroad”  
• Encourage USG to create standard of behavior and associated training 
program for civilian employees 
• Enforce standardization of and compliance with all Service-level CoC 
training regulations 
2. Mindset  
• Inculcate NMS mindset 
• Encourage and develop Joint Force, interagency, and multinational 
partner interaction and communication through expanded training 
opportunities 
3. Training 
• Eliminate CoC Level A training program 
• Establish Level B as the baseline required for all DoD personnel upon 
entry into the Armed Force 
• Adopt Core Captivity Curriculum Training program 
• Increased training capacity through expansion of available instructor 
resources and computer-based training 
• Consider creation of a Joint CCCT training facility 
• Create CCCT for interagency and multinational partners 
4. Supporting Changes 
• Discontinue use of Social Security Numbers and create randomly 
generated Military Identification Number 
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APPENDIX A. AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL STUDENT 
DEMOGRAPHICS AND PROTOCOL 
ID Number Rank/Grade 
Yrs in 
Service Level of SERE First CoC 
USAF-O-1 Major 18 A Basic 
USAF-O-2 Major 12.5 B-Fairchild A/R/O 
USAF-O-3 Major 13 A A/R/O 
USAF-O-4 2Lt 14 A Basic 
USAF-O-5 1Lt 3 none A/R/O 
USAF-O-6 1Lt 3 none ROTC 
USAF-O-7 Major 13 A Academy 
USAF-O-8 Major 13 none ROTC 
USAF-O-9 Major 14 A Academy 
USAF-O-10 Major 14 B-AB Def Crs ROTC 
USAF-O-11 Major 20 A Basic 
USAF-O-12 Major 14 C-Fairchild,theater, USAFA Academy 
USAF-O-13 Major 12 A-only field training ROTC 
USAF-O-14 Major 18 A-USAFA Academy 
USAF-O-15 Captain 7.5 B-Lakenheath/SERE instructor OTS 
USAF-O-16 Captain 6 A Basic 
USAF-O-17 Captain 20+ A-SQ Basic 
USAF-O-18 Major 12 A A/R/O 
USAF-O-19 Major 13 A Academy 
USAF-O-20 Major 14 B-Fairchild ROTC 
USAF-O-21 Major 12 A ROTC 
USAF-E-1 SSgt/E5 9 A Basic 
USAF-E-2 SSgt/E5 11 A Basic 
USAF-E-3 TSgt/E6 15 A Basic 
USAF-E-4 TSgt/E6 10 A Basic 
USAF-E-5 SSgt/E5 8 A Basic 
USAF-E-6 TSgt/E6 19+ B-Fairchild Basic 
USAF-E-7 Amn/E2 1+ A Basic 
USAF-E-8 SSgt/E5 6 A Basic 
USAF-E-9 SSgt/E5 9.5 A Basic 
USAF-E-10 SSgt/E5 12 A Basic 
USAF-E-11 SrA/E4 4 none ROTC/Basic
USAF-E-12 SSgt/E5 11 A Basic 
USAF-E-13 TSgt/E6 20 B-Combat Com/Mob Tech Basic 
USAF-E-14 TSgt/E6 13 A Basic 
USAF-E-15 SrA/E4 4 B/SF Tech School Basic 
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USAF-E-16 SSgt/E5 6 none Basic 
USAF-E-17 SSgt/E5 5+ A Basic 
USAF-E-18 SSgt/E5 7 C/SV80,SV83 Basic 
USAF-E-19 SSgt/E5 7 C/SV80,SV83 Basic 
USAF-E-20 SMSgt/E8 22.5 none Basic 
USAF-E-21 MSgt/E7 20 A Basic 
 
USA-O-1 Major 15 A ROTC 
USA-O-2 LTC 21 none ROTC 
USA-O-3 Colonel 24 C ROTC 
USA-O-4 Major 12 A ROTC 
USA-O-5 Captain 10 C Basic 
USA-O-6 Major 12 B-ILRPS Academy 
USA-O-7 Captain 11 A Basic 
USA-O-8 Captain 10 A A/R/O 
USA-O-9 Major 14 B-JFKSWS ROTC 
USA-O-10 Major 13 A Basic 
USA-O-11 Major 14 A Academy 
USA-O-12 Captain 10 B-Ft Rucker Academy 
USA-O-13 Major 15 A Basic 
USA-O-14 Major 14 C-Ft Bragg A/R/O 
USA-O-15 Major 10 B-ILRPS, INTAC Academy 
USA-O-16 Captain 11 A A/R/O 
USA-O-17 Captain 8.5 A-none ROTC 
USA-O-18 Captain 10 C-Spec Ops ROTC 
USA-O-19 Captain 10 B-SWC ROTC 
USA-O-20 Major 16 C-Ft Bragg OBC 
USA-E-1 SFC/E7 17.5 none Basic 
USA-E-2 SSG/E6 9 none Basic 
USA-E-3 SGT/E5 7 none Basic 
USA-E-4 SFC/E7 15 A Basic 
USA-E-5 SGT/E5 4 none Basic 
USA-E-6 SGT/E5 6 none Basic 
USA-E-7 SFC/E7 20 A Basic 
USA-E-8 SFC/E7 15 A Basic 
USA-E-9 SPC/E4 5 A Basic 
USA-E-10 SPC/E4 9   Basic 
USA-E-11 CSM/E9 25 C-Infantry School Basic 
USA-E-12 SFC/E7 14 A Basic 
USA-E-13 SPC/E4 5 A Basic 
USA-E-14 MSG/E8 19 C Basic 
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USA-E-15 PFC/E2 1 none Basic 
USA-E-16 SPC/E4 3 A Basic 
USA-E-17 SGM/E9 26 A Basic 
USA-E-18 SFC/E7 22 A Basic 
USA-E-19 SGT/E5 0.5 A Basic 
USA-E-20 SFC/E7 13 A Basic 
USA-E-21 SFC/E7 18 C-USFK Basic 
 
USN-O-1 LT 6 A OCS 
USN-O-2 LT 5 none Basic 
USN-O-3 LT 14 A Basic 
USN-O-4 LT 5 A ROTC 
USN-O-5 LT 6 A A/R/O 
USN-O-6 LT 15 B-JEST/Jungle Environ Basic 
USN-O-7 LT 5 none A/R/O 
USN-O-8 LT 9 A A/R/O 
USN-O-9 LT 6 none OCS 
USN-O-10 LT 20 A 
1st Tech 
School 
USN-O-11 LT 17 A Basic 
USN-O-12 LT 14 A OCS 
USN-O-13 LT 6 A A/R/O 
USN-O-14 LT 6 A Academy 
USN-O-15 LCDR 12 A ROTC 
USN-O-16 LTJG 12+ A Basic/ROTC 
USN-O-17 LTJG 3 A Academy 
USN-O-18 LT 4 A ROTC 
USN-O-19 LT 5 none OCS 
USN-O-20 LT 5 never got it A/R/O 
USN-O-21 LT 3 A A/R/O 
USN-E-1 E7/CTIC 13 C-SV83 Basic 
USN-E-2 E8 17 C-SV83 Basic 
USN-E-3 E7 17 C Basic 
USN-E-4 CWO2 20 none Basic 
USN-E-5 E8 17 A Basic 
USN-E-6 E7/ABEC 17 A Basic 
USN-E-7 E7/CTAC 18 none Basic 
USN-E-8 E7 18 A Basic 
USN-E-9 E7/CPO 17 none Basic 
USN-E-10 CPO 15 none Basic 
USN-E-11 E7/CPO 16 B-FASOTRAGRWPAC Basic 
USN-E-12 E5 12 A Basic 
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USN-E-13 E6 9 A Basic 
USN-E-14 SA 10 months A Basic 
USN-E-15 SN 1 A Basic 
USN-E-16 E3 3 months none Basic 
USN-E-17 SN 4 months none Basic 
USN-E-18 E1/SA 6 months A Basic 
USN-E-19 E3 6 A Basic 
USN-E-20 PO31E-4 1 A Basic 
 
USMC-O-1 Captain 8 C-in theater from USAF A/R/O 
USMC-O-2 Captain 10 A Basic 
USMC-O-3 Captain 7 none 
Don't 
remember 
USMC-O-4 Captain 16 none Basic 
USMC-O-5 Captain 10 A A/R/O 
USMC-O-6 Major 20 none Basic 
USMC-O-7 Major 15 Don't Know/pilot tng Basic 
USMC-O-8 Major 12 none OCS 
USMC-O-9 Major 18 none Basic 
USMC-O-
10 Major 13 none Basic 
USMC-O-
11 Captain 9 B-SERE school in Maine SERE School 
USMC-O-
12 Captain 10 none; E&E plan A/R/O 
USMC-O-
13 Major 9.5 B-USAFA Academy 
USMC-O-
14 Captain 6 A ROTC 
USMC-O-
15 Major 16 A Basic 
USMC-O-
16 Major 11 A A/R/O 
USMC-O-
17 Captain 10 A Basic 
USMC-O-
18 Captain 10 B-flight school Basic 
USMC-O-
19 Captain 5 B-unit/INF BN ROTC 
USMC-O-
20 Captain 10 C-Coronado OCS 
USMC-O-
21 Major 14 B-USAFA Academy 
USMC-E-1 LCpl/E3 1 A Basic 
USMC-E-2 PFC/E2 1 A Basic 
USMC-E-3 GySgt/E7 19 A Basic 
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USMC-E-4 PFC/E2 7 months A Basic 
USMC-E-5 PFC/E2 less than 1 A Basic 
USMC-E-6 Pvt/E1 6 months A Basic 
USMC-E-7 Pvt/E1 6 months A Basic 
USMC-E-8 LCpl/E3 2 A Basic 
USMC-E-9 Pvt/E1 1 A Basic 
USMC-E-
10 PFC/E2 10 months A Basic 
USMC-E-
11 PFC/E2 6 months A Basic 
USMC-E-
12 LCpl/E3 5 B-Fairchild Basic 
USMC-E-
13 LCpl/E3 1.8 A Basic 
USMC-E-
14 PFC/E2 7 months A Basic 
USMC-E-
15 LCpl/E3 1 A Basic 
USMC-E-
16 Pvt/E1 9 months A Basic 
USMC-E-
17 LCpl/E3 1.5 A Basic 
USMC-E-
18 PFC/E2 9 months A Basic 
USMC-E-
19 LCpl/E3 1 A Basic 
USMC-E-
20 PFC/E2 7 months A Basic 
 
ID 
Number Rank Service Yrs in Service Country 
I-1 CPT Navy 12 Unk-Europe 
I-2 LCDR Navy 21 Greece 
I-3 O2 Army 3 Uzbekistan 
I-4 O6 Army 25 Mongolia 
I-5 O3 Army 10 Poland 
I-6 Capt/O3 Air Force 9 Poland 
I-7 LTC Army 21 Bulgaria 
I-8 1Lt Army 5 Turkey 
I-9 O2 Army 3 Uzbekistan 
I-10 LtJG Navy 4 Turkey 
I-11 LT1 Army 3 Czech Rep 
I-12 O2 Army 8 Hungary 
I-13 Lt Col Air Force 18 Indonesia 
I-14 CDR Navy 21 Greece 
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I-15 Lt Col Air Force 23 Czechia 
I-16 1Lt Air Force 8 Turkey 
I-17 Lt Col Air Force 20 Pakistan 
I-18 Lt Col Army 20 Pakistan 
I-19 LTC Army 24 Czech Rep 









































A. AMERICAN MILITARY OFFICER AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
The Code of Conduct: Is it relevant in today’s asymmetric threat 
environment? 
The purpose of this survey is to examine the opinions of military personnel 
regarding the effectiveness of the Code of Conduct (CoC) against asymmetric 
threats.  As America transitions away from a “major theater war” posture and 
increases participation in “operations other than war,” the Department of Defense 
must consider the impact of different capture situations (i.e. prisoner of war, 
hostage, or detainee) on U.S. forces serving with interagency and coalition 
partners.  All responses are nonattributional unless the respondent provides 
contact data for citation in the final report.  Please address questions to Major 
Laura Ryan, lmryan@nps.edu or 831-643-9093. 
Rank/Grade:________________Service:___________Yrs in Service:_________ 
1.  When did you first receive CoC training? 
 Academy/ROTC/OTS/OCS   Basic Training   First technical training school  
 First unit of assignment    Other (please specify):______________ 
2.  Have you received yearly refresher training? 
 Yes  Format: Video/Computer/Briefing/Pamphlet/Other 
 No 
3.  What is your highest level of Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) 
training? 
 Level A (all members/yearly) 
 Level B (moderate risk of capture)   Source: 
 Level C (high risk of capture)    Source: 
4.  Can you recite the six articles of the CoC verbatim? 
 All  Most  Some  None 
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5.  Can you discuss the basic ideas/guidance contained within the six Codes? 
All  Most  Some  None 
6.  Do you believe that the CoC should remain strictly a moral guide or become a 
legally binding code? 
 Moral guide  Code of law 
7.  Do you understand the relationship between the CoC, the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, and the Geneva Conventions? 
Yes   No 
8.  Do you think that the DoD and/or U.S. government should create a “code of 
conduct” for civilians working with military personnel? 
 Yes   No 
Please review the CoC and answer the questions below. 
I.  I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our 
way of life.  I am prepared to give my life in their defense. 
II.  I will never surrender of my own free will.  If in command, I will never 
surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist. 
III.  If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available.  I will 
make every effort to escape and aid others to escape.  I will accept neither parole 
nor special favors from the enemy. 
IV.  If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners.  
I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my 
comrades.  If I am senior, I will take command.  If not, I will obey the lawful orders 
of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way. 
V.  When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to 
give name, rank, service number, and date of birth.  I will evade answering 
further questions to the utmost of my ability.  I will make no oral or written 
statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause. 
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VI.  I will never forget that I am an American fighting for freedom, 
responsible for my action, and dedicated to the principles which made my 
country free.  I will trust in my God and in the United States of America. 
9.  Do you believe that the CoC, as currently written, is applicable to hostile 
peacetime government detention situations (i.e. The EP-3 crew in China)? 
Yes   No 
10.  Do you believe that the CoC, as currently written, is applicable to political 
prisoner/hostage situations (i.e. The American Embassy in Iran; CW3 Durant in 
Somalia)? 
 Yes   No 
11.  Do you believe that the CoC, as currently written, is applicable to terrorist 
hostage situations (i.e. General Dozier in Italy)? 
 Yes   No 
12.  Do you believe that the CoC is still relevant? 
 Yes   No 
13.  Do you believe that the CoC should be reworded to address the new threat 
spectrum and captivity environment? 
 Yes   No 









B. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY OFFICER QUESTIONNAIRE 
Conduct After Capture Training: Is it relevant in today’s threat 
environment? 
The purpose of this survey is to examine the opinions of international 
military personnel regarding the effectiveness of conduct after capture (CAC) 
training against asymmetric threats.  Many countries originally developed CAC 
training to prepare for a conventional “prisoner of war” situation.  With the 
increased emphasis on “operations other than war,” many nations must address 
detention and hostages situations.  All survey responses are 
nonattributional/anonymous unless the respondent provides contact data for 
citation in the final thesis report.  Please address any questions to Major Laura 
Ryan, lmryan@nps.edu or 831-643-9093. 
Rank/Grade:____________Service:____________Yrs in Service:_________ 
Country:________________ 
1.  Does your country have a Code of Conduct After Capture (CCAC)? 
 Yes/When was it created?__________  No  Not Sure 
2.  When did you first receive after-capture training? 
 Commissioning Source   First technical training school  
First unit of assignment  Other (please specify):___________________ 
3.  Do you receive yearly after-capture training? 
 Yes/Format: Video/Computer/Briefing/Pamphlet/Other  
 No 
4.  Is your CCAC a moral guide or a legally binding code? 
 Moral guide  Code of law  Not sure 
5.  Do you think that civilians working/deployed with military personnel should 
have a Code of Conduct After Capture and receive after-capture training? 
 Yes   No   Not sure 
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6.  Do you believe that your after-capture training is applicable to peacetime 
government detention situations (i.e. you are captured by the forces of a 
recognized/legitimate government during a peacetime/routine mission or 
operations other than war)? 
 Yes   No   Not sure 
7.  Do you believe that your after-capture training is applicable to a political 
prisoner/hostage situation (i.e. you are captured by a non-government/non-
terrorist organization during peacetime or operations other than war)? 
 Yes   No   Not sure 
8.  Do you believe that your CCAC is applicable to a terrorist hostage situation? 





































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
97 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Baumgartner, Dan.  Interview by author, 24 March 2004, Crystal City.  
Written notes.  Office of the Secretary of Defense/Defense POW/Missing 
Personnel Office. 
 
2. ___________.  OSD/DPMO Personnel Recovery Policy Directorate 
Briefing.  22 March 2004 
 
3. Burrows, William E.  Deep Black.  New York: Berkley Books, 1986. 
 
4. Cadle, Mike.  “W.Va. Soldiers on OIF Mission Detained by Iran.”  The On 
Guard, August 2003. 
 
5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Handbook 5260.  Commander’s 
Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness, 1997. 
 
6. “Code of Conduct In-Depth.”  Available [online]: 
http://www.armystudyguide.com/code_of_conduct/in-depth.htm [16 June 
2004]. 
 
7. “Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 2310.5 ‘Accounting For Missing 
Persons,’” Fact Sheet, 31 January 2000.  Available [online]: 
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Camp/9276/dod_missing_persons.ht
ml [12 July 2004]. 
 
8. Dershowitz, Alan M.  “Rules of War Enable Terror.” The Baltimore Sun, 28 
May 2004. 
 
9. Doyle, Robert C.  A Prisoner’s Duty: Great Escapes in U.S. Military 
History.  Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 
 
10. Dozier, Michael.  Interview by author, 24 March 2004, Washington D.C.  
Written notes.  Headquarters Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of 
Staff, G3, DAMO-OD-PR. 
 
11. DRAFT National Security Presidential Directive __ “Recovery of Isolated 
or Missing U.S. Government Personnel Abroad.”  This draft document is 
available only through OSD/DPMO. 
 
12. Gotowicki, Stephen H.  “Middle East Terrorism: New Form of Warfare or 
Mission Impossible?”  Military Review, May-June 1997.  Available [online]: 




13. Headquarters, United States Air Force Prisoner of War Experience 
Analysis Program.  “Analysis of Returned POWs - Evaluation of Survival, 
Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) Training,” Report No. Series 700-
EA-2, March 1976. 
 
14. Hunter, Edna .J.  “Prisoners of War: Readjustment and Rehabilitation.”  In 
Handbook of Military Psychology, ed. R. Gal and A.D. Mangelsdorff.  New 
York: Wiley, 1991. 
 
15. Joint Chiefs of Staff.  “Global War on Terrorism.”  Available [online]: 
http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/chairman/Posture_Statement.html [10 August 
2004]. 
 
16. Joint Doctrine Manual J7 DLLS 2 2000-09-28.  The Code of Conduct After 
Capture for the Canadian Forces.  Available [online]: 
http://www.forces.gc.ca, 28 September 2000 [February 2003]. 
 
17. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency.  Executive Agent Instruction: 
Requirements for Wartime Level B Training in Support of the Code of 
Conduct.  Virginia: HQ JPRA, 2001. 
 
18. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency.  Executive Agent Instruction: 
Requirements for Peacetime Level B Training in Support of the Code of 
Conduct.  Virginia: HQ JPRA, 2001. 
 
19. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency.  Executive Agent Instruction: 
Requirements for Wartime Level C Training in Support of the Code of 
Conduct.  Virginia: HQ JPRA, 2001. 
 
20. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency.  Executive Agent Instruction: 
Requirements for Peacetime Level C Training in Support of the Code of 
Conduct.  Virginia: HQ JPRA, 2001. 
 
21. Joint Strategy Review 1999.  Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1999. 
 
22. Lieblich, Amia.  Seasons of Captivity: The Inner World of POWs.  New 
York: New York University Press, 1994. 
 
23. Miller, W.N.  “Captive Reactions Initially and Through the First 12-24 
Hours,” Unpublished report.  San Diego: Center for POW Studies, Naval 
Health Research Center, 1974. 
 
24. “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004.”  
Available 
[online]:http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_377_National
%20Military%20Strategy%2013%20May%2004.pdf [12 August 2004]. 
99 
 
25. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.”  
Available [online]: http://www.whitehouse.gov./nsc/nss.html [12 August 
2004]. 
 
26. Percival, Gary, Interview by author, 16 December 2003, Spokane, 
Washington.  Written notes.  Joint Personnel Recovery Agency – Fairchild 
Air Force Base. 
 
27. Pfanner, Toni.  “Military Uniforms and the Law of War.”  International 
Review of the Red Cross, Volume 86, Number 853, March 2004.  
Available [online]: 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5ZBE5X/$File/IRRC_853
_Pfanner.pdf [12 August 2004].  
 
28. Porter, Richard E.  “The Code of Conduct: A Guide to Moral 
Responsibility.”  Available [online]: 
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/Jan-
Feb/porter.html [February 2004]. 
 
29. Porter, Richard E.  “Military Hostages: What They Need to Know and 
Don’t.”  Available 
[online]:http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1982/jan-
feb/porter.html [February 2004]. 
 
30. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol 1), 8 June 1977.  Available [online]: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm] [22 July 2004]. 
 
31. Report by the Secretary of Defense’s Advisory Committee on Prisoners of 
War.  POW…The Fight Continues After the Battle.  August 1955. 
 
32. Richelson, Jeffrey T.  The U.S. Intelligence Community.  Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1999. 
 
33. Russell, Elizabeth and Russell, Terrence.  Interview by author, 15 
December 2003, Spokane, Washington.  Written notes.  Joint Personnel 
Recovery Agency – Fairchild Air Force Base. 
 
34. Schmitt, Michael.  “Rethinking the Geneva Conventions.”  Crimes of War 
Project, 30 January 2003.  [Available online: 




35. Spivey Randall W.  Interview by author, 7 June 2004, Spokane, 
Washington.  Telephone.  R.S. Consulting, L.L.C. 
 
36. Staten, C.L.  “War on Terror-2001: What We Expect in the Coming War on 
Terrorism.”  Available [online]: http://www.emergency.com/2001/war-on-
terror-2001.htm [25 August 2004]. 
 
37. Strub, Margaret and Kelly, Steven.  Interview by author, 25 March 2004, 
Virginia.  Written notes.  Joint Personnel Recovery Agency – Ft Belvoir. 
 
38. 2001 Department of Defense Personnel Recovery Conference - After 




39. U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General School.  The Military Commander 
and the Law.  Alabama: AFJAGS Press, 2000. 
 
40. U.S. Air Force Pamphlet 110-31.  International Law - The Conduct of 
Armed Conflict and Air Operations.  Washington, DC: Department of the 
Air Force, 19 November 1976 
 
41. U.S. Air Force Posture Statement 2004.  Author received emailed copy of 
document from member of U.S. Air Force Air Staff. 
 
42. U.S. Air Force Wing Regulation 50-2.  United States Air Force Survival 
School Code of Conduct Training.  Fairchild AFB, Washington: 3636th 
Combat Crew Training Wing, 1983. 
 
43. U.S. Army, Field Manual 21-76.  US Army Survival Manual.  Washington, 
DC: HQ Department of the Army, 1991 
 
44. U.S. Army, Field Manual 21-78.  Prisoner of War Resistance.  Washington 
DC: HQ Department of the Army, 1981. 
 
45. U.S. Army, Field Manual 34-52.  Intelligence Interrogation.  Washington 
DC: HQ Department of the Army, 1992. 
 
46. U.S. Army Pamphlet 355-106.  Code of the U.S. Fighting Man.  
Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Army 23 September 1957 
 
47. U.S. Army Pamphlet 690-47.  Civilian Personnel, DA Civilian Employee 




48. U.S. Department of Defense Instruction 1300.7.  Training and Education 
to Support the Code of Conduct.  Washington, DC: ASD(ISA), 2000.  
Available [online]: 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/d13007x.htm [9 August 
2004]. 
 
49. U.S. Department of Defense Instruction 1300.21 Code of Conduct (CoC) 
Training and Education.  Washington, DC: ASD(ISA), 2001.  Available 
[online]: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/130021.htm [12 
August 2004]. 
 
50. U.S. Department of Defense Instruction 1300.23 Isolated Personnel 
Training for DoD Civilian and Contractors.  Washington, DC: ASD(ISA), 20 
August 2003. 
 
51. U.S. Department of Defense.  Report of Defense Review Committee for 
the Code of Conduct, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics), 1976. 
 
52. Veterans Administration - Office of Planning and Program Evaluation.  
POW: Study of Former Prisoners of War.  Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, May 1980. 
 
53. Wilson, Charles E.  “Training and Education Measures Necessary to 
Support the Code of Conduct,” 18 August 1955. 
 
54. Wood, David. “U.S. POWs Could Face Brutal Treatment in Iraq War.”  
Available [online]: 
http://www.newhousenews.com/archive/wood032103.html [03 March 
2004]. 
 
55. Zulaika, Joseba and Douglass, William A.  Terror and Taboo: The Follies, 






























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
103
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. ABCA Armies.  Quadripartite Advisory Publication Number 215: National 
Policies Regarding Conduct After Capture (CAC), 2000.  Available on 
restricted ABCA website only. 
 
2. Air Land Sea Application Center FM 3-50.3, NTTP 3-50.3, AFTTP(I) 3-
2.26.  Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Procedures for 
Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, 19 March 2003.  Available [online]: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/ [9 August 
2004]. 
 
3. Aldrich, Roger and Krueger, Peter.  Interview by author, 16 December 
2003, Spokane, Washington.  Written notes.  Joint Personnel Recovery 
Agency – Fairchild Air Force Base. 
 
4. Anderson, Mary A.  Captivity and Culture: Insights from the Desert Storm 
Prisoner of War Experience.  Rhode Island: Naval War College, 6 March 
1996. 
 
5. Bamford, James.  The Puzzle Palace.  New York: Penguin Books, 1983. 
 
6. Bellamy, Robert.  Interview by author, 24 March 2004, Washington D.C.  
Written notes.  Headquarter United States Air Force.  
 
7. Biderman, Albert D.  March to Calumny: The Story of American POWs in 
the Korean War.  New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963. 
 
8. Boucher, Richard.  International Terrorism: American Hostages, 20 
February 2002.  Available 
[online]:http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8190.htm [November 2003]. 
 
9. Bowden, Mark.  Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War.  New York: 
Penguin Books, 2000 
 
10. Carey, Dave.  The Ways We Choose: Lessons for Life From a POW’s 
Experience. Oregon: Book Partners, Inc., 2000. 
 
11. Chinnery, Philip D.  Any Time, Any Place: Fifty Years of USAF Air 
Commando and Special Operations Forces, 1944-1994.  Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press, 1994. 
 
12. Defense Intelligence Reference Document: DESERT STORM POW 
Study.  Virginia: JSSA/DO, 1994.  Restricted access document – available 
through JPRA library. 
104
 
13. Dorr, Robert F.  “History of Air Force Special Operations - A ‘Rich 
Legacy,” A Tribute to Special Operations.  Florida: Faircount LLC, 2003. 
 
14. Doyle, Robert C.  Voices From Captivity: Interpreting the American POW 
Narrative. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1994. 
 
15. 84-2:S.Rept.2832.  Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and 
Exploitation of American Military and Civilian Prisoners, 31 December 
1956. 
 
16. Executive Order 10631.  Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed 
Forces of the United States, 1955. 
 
17. Grant, Zalin.  Survivors: Vietnam POWs Tell Their Stories.  New York: Da 
Capo Press, 1994. 
 
18. Grosscup, Beau.  The Newest Explosions of Terrorism.  New Jersey: New 
Horizon Press, 2002. 
 
19. Hass, Michael E.  Apollo’s Warriors: United States Air Force Special 
Operations during the Cold War.  Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 
2002. 
 
20. Headquarters United States Air Force Personnel and Training Research 
Center.  “Report of the Working Group on Survival Training,” Texas: Air 
Research and Development Command, February 1956.  Restricted 
access document – available through JPRA library only. 
 
21. Headquarters, United States Air Force South East Asia Prisoner of War 
Analysis Program Report.  “Evolvement of Policy and Doctrine on the 
Code of Conduct.” Report No. Series 700/BA/BC/EH-1, December 1973.  
Restricted access document – available through JPRA library only. 
 
22. Hubbell, John G.  P.O.W.: A Definitive History of the American Prisoner-
of-War Experience in Vietnam, 1964-1973.  New York: Reader’s Digest 
Press, 1976. 
 
23. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency document, “Results of Desert Storm 
POW COC Survey.”  Restricted access document – available through 
JPRA library only. 
 
24. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency document, “OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM: Personnel Recovery Lessons Learned.”  Restricted access 
document – available through JPRA library only. 
 
105
25. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency document, “Briefing on the Code of 
Conduct’s Applicability to the Peacetime Conduct of Naval Personnel in a 
Situation of Hostile Detention.”  Restricted access document – available 
through JPRA library only. 
 
26. Joint Services Interrogation Wing. “Prison Handling and Tactical 
Questioning.”  United Kingdom, 1980. 
 
27. McGrath, John M.  Prisoner of War: Six Years in Hanoi.  Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press, 1975. 
 
28. McRaven, William H.  Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations 
Warfare - Theory and Practice.  California: Presidio Press, 1995. 
 
29. Miles, Donna.  “Code of Conduct: Guide to Keeping the Faith,” American 




30. Page, William Frank.  The Health of Former Prisoners of War: Results 
from the Medical Examination Survey of Former POWs of World War II 
and the Korean Conflict.  Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992 
 
31. Parks, W. Hays.  “Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms.”  
Chicago Journal of International Law, 2003.  Available [online]: 
http://www.web.onetel.com/naspals/parks-nonstandard.pdf [15 August 
2004].   
 
32. Percival, Gary L.  “Dynamics of Captivity Survival Briefing.” 
 
33. ________.  “Return with Honor: Training to Survive Captivity Briefing.” 
 
34. Pillar, Paul R.  Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy.  Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 
 
35. Ploof, Robert.  Interview by author, 17 December 2003, Spokane, 
Washington.  Written notes.  Fairchild Air Force Base. 
 
36. “Prison of War: Your Rights & Obligations Under the Geneva 
Conventions,” American Forces Information Service, Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 1987. 
 
37. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 








39. Richelson, Jeffrey T.  A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth 
Century.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
 
40. Roberts, Adam and Guelff, Richard.  Documents on the Laws of War.  
New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2000. 
 
41. Robertson, Geoffrey.  Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global 
Justice.  New York: The New Press, 1999. 
 
42. Rowe, James N.  Five Years To Freedom.  New York: Ballantine Books, 
1971. 
 
43. Sampley, Ted.  “The Military Code of Conduct: It’s Unrealistic and 
Deadly.”  Available [online]: http://www.usvetdsp.com/story12.htm 
[February 2004]. 
 
44. Shapiro, Albert.  “POW – Americans in Enemy Hands.”  Video for 
television broadcast, 1986. 
 
45. Stockdale, James B.  Experience as a POW in Vietnam.  Washington, DC: 
Naval War College Review, 1998. 
 
46. Swan, Jennifer H.  “EP-3E Crewmembers Hold Vivid Memories of Ordeal 
in China,” Stars and Stripes.  Available [online]: 
http://ww2.pstripes.osd.mil/01/may01/ed053001b.html [December 2003. 
 
47. Title 10, United States Code Sections 1501-1513, The Missing Persons 
Act. 1996.  Available [online]: http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/family/mpa.htm [12 
July 2004]. 
 
48. Toliver, Raymond. The Interrogator - the Story of Hans Scharff, Luftwaffe’s 
Master Interrogator.  Aero Publishers, 1978. 
 
49. U.S. Air Force Instruction 36-2209.  Survival and Code of Conduct 
Training.  Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 28 February 
1994.  Available [online]: http://www.e-
publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-2209/afi36-2209.pdf [9 August 2004]. 
 
50. U.S. Air Force Pamphlet 10-231.  Federal Civilian Deployment Guide.  
Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1 April 1999. 
 
107
51. U.S. Air Force Pamphlet 35-19.  Prisoner of War: Rights & Obligations 
Under the Geneva Convention.  Washington, DC: American Forces 
Information Service, 1987. 
 
52. U.S. Air Force Policy Directive 16-13.  Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and 
Escape  
(SERE).  Available [online]: http://www.e-
publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/16/afpd16-13/afpd16-13.pdf [9 August 2004]. 
 
53. U.S. Air Force Regulation 125-25.  Prisoners of War.  Washington, DC: 
Department of the Air Force, 9 November 1970. 
 
54. U.S. Army, Field Manual 21-78.  Resistance and Escape.  Washington, 
DC: HQ Department of the Army, 1989. 
 
55. U.S. Army, Field Manual 30-15.  Intelligence Interrogation.  Washington 
DC: HQ Department of the Army, 1978. 
 
56. U.S. Army, Field Manual 30-101.  Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, 
and Exploitation of POW.  Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 
1956. 
 
57. U.S. Army, Field Manual 34-52.  Intelligence Interrogation.  Washington 
DC: HQ Department of the Army, 1987. 
 
58. U.S. Army.  “Online Promotion Study Guide - The Code of Conduct.”  
Available [online]: http://www.military-net.com/education/mpdcode.html 
[November 2003]. 
 
59. U.S. Army Regulation 350-30.  Code of Conduct, Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Training.  Washington, DC: Department 
of the Army, December 1985.  Available [online]: 
http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r350_30.pdf [9 August 2004]. 
 
60. U.S. Commander-In-Chief Pacific Instruction 3461.3B.  Enemy Prisoners 
of War, Civilian Internees, and other Detained Persons, 15 June 1985. 
 
61. U.S. Defense Security Service.  Code of Conduct for Personnel Subject to 
Terrorist Activity.  Available [online]: http://www.dss.mil/search-
dir/training/csg/security/T5terror/Code.htm [December 2003]. 
 
62. U.S. Defense Security Service.  Hijacking Survival Guidelines.  Available 
[online]: http://www.dss.mil/search-
dir/training/csg/security/T5terror/Hijack.htm [December 2003]. 
 
108
63. U.S. Defense Security Service.  Kidnapping and Hostage Survival 
Guidelines.  Available [online]: http://www.dss.mil/search-
dir/training/csg/security/T5terror/Kidnap.htm [December 2003]. 
 
64. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 1300.7.  Code of Conduct for 
Personnel Subject to Terrorist Activity, 19 December 1964. 
 
65. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 1300.7.  Training and Education 
Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct, December 1988. 
 
66. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 2310.2.  Personnel Recovery, 22 
December 2000.  Available [online]: 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/d23102x.htm [9 August 
2004]. 
 
67. U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02.  Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April 2001. 
 
68. U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-07.  Joint Doctrine for 
Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995. 
 
69. U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-07.2.  Joint Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, 17 March 1998. 
 
70. U.S. Department of Defense Joint Staff Guide 5260 Service Member’s 
Personal Protection Guide: A Self-Help Handbook to Combating 
Terrorism, July 1996. 
 
71. U.S. Department of Defense Joint Staff Guide 5260 Service Member’s 
Personal Protection Guide: A Self-Help Guide to Combat Terrorism While 
Overseas, April 2000. 
 
72. U.S. Department of Defense Joint Staff.  Joint Vision 2020: America’s 
Military - Preparing for Tomorrow.  Washington, DC: US Government 
Printing Office, June 2000. 
 
73. U.S. Department of Defense.  Quadrennial Defense Review Report.  
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 30 September 2001. 
 
74. U.S. Department of Defense Pamphlet 5-5.  The Battle for Liberty: 
Instructor’s Handbook, 1958. 
 
75. U.S. Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps 
Order 3460.1A.  Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support 
the Code of Conduct.  Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 11 June 
1990.  Available [online]: 
109
http://www.usmc.mil/directiv.nsf/0/7f9376a070febb8285256497005b2a4a/
$FILE/MCO%203460.1A.pdf [9 August 2004]. 
 
76. U.S. Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps 
Order 3460.2.  Policy for Personnel Recovery and Repatriation.  
Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2 December 2002.  Available 
[online]: 
http://www.usmc.mil/directiv.nsf/0/72e7cc2c97ff16b785256cb0004e5af5/$
FILE/MCO%203460.2.pdf [9 August 2004]. 
 
77. U.S.Navy, United States Navy Operational Instruction (OPNAVINST) 
1000.24B.  Code of Conduct Training, 12 May 1989.  Available [online]: 
http://neds.daps.dla.mil/Directives/1000b24.pdf [9 August 2004]. 
 
78. U.S. Department of State Publication.  Code of Conduct for Personnel 
Subject to Terrorist Activity Fact Sheet, 17 October 1995. 
 
79. U. S. Department of State Publication 9400.  Hostage Taking: Preparation, 
Avoidance, and Survival, 1984. 
 
80. U.S. Department of State Publication 10942.  A Safe Trip Abroad, March 
2002.  Available [online]: http://travel.state.gov/asafetripabroad.html 
[December 2003]. 
 
81. U.S. Department of Defense.  Report of Defense Review Committee for 
the Code of Conduct.  Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of 
































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
111
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Colonel Joe E. Tyner, USAF 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Captain Steven Ashby, USN 
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California 
 
5. James J. Wirtz 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
 
7. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency 
Fairchild Air Force Base 
Spokane, Washington 
 
8. Dan Baumgartner 
OASD/ISA/DPMO  
Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 
 
9. Mike Dozier 
HQ/Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, DAMO-OD-PR 
Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 
 
 
 
